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Abstract: We examine the provision of insurance against non-observable
liquidity shocks for time-inconsistent agents who can privately store re-
sources. When lack of self-control is strong enough, optimal contracts
are similar to individual financial accounts with remunerated savings
and costly borrowing. The corresponding rate of return decreases with
savings, which gives a theoretical rationale for pension accounts with
decreasing incentive schemes, as implemented in most developed coun-
tries. Extending the model to an infinite horizon, we show that, in the
presence of repeated shocks, optimal contracts lead to impoverishment
almost surely. Usury laws, capping interest rates, worsen this tendency
to over-indebtedness for consumers with low risk aversion. By contrast,
hidden storage constrains resource allocation for time-consistent agents,
so that optimal contracts induce them to accumulate wealth. Those re-
sults show how lack of self-control changes the nature of optimal savings
and borrowing instruments, with normative implications in terms of tax
policy and credit regulation.
Keywords : Time-inconsistency, self-control, mechanism design, insurance, over-indebtedness,
retirement savings, consumer credit, credit regulation, saving incentives.
JEL classification numbers : C61, C63, C73, D82, E21, H21.
∗. Toulouse School of Economics and IEP Toulouse, Email: cherbfred@gmail.com,
1, Esplanade de l’Université, 31000 Toulouse
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Consumers exposed to future preference shocks optimally smooth their consump-
tion through contracts with financial intermediaries. The resulting flexibility in the
timing of consumption, while desirable under the time-consistent preferences assu-
med in the literature on optimal insurance provision, however may be costly when
consumers have present-biased preferences. As pointed out by Strotz (1955), Phelps
and Pollak (1968), Laibson (1997) and the subsequent literature, consumers then va-
lue constraints on their future choices. The main purpose of this paper is to analyze
optimal saving and borrowing instruments for a weak-willed agent, and to understand
whether such contracts are able to stabilize debt and consumption when the agent
faces repeated shocks. These issues are particularly relevant as time-inconsistency
may induce excessive debt accumulation or undersavings, by either an individual or
a governement.
We assume quasi-hyperbolic preferences and consider (initially), as in Diamond
and Dybvig (1983), two periods of consumption, 1 and 2, and an initial period 0 at
which the agent contracts with a competitive financial intermediary (who therefore
maximizes his expected utility). The agent receives at date 1 a private taste shock
θ that acts as a multiplicative factor on his utility. The first-best contract is an
insurance mechanism that allocates higher consumption to “high types”, i.e. indivi-
duals facing liquidity shocks in period 1. However, under asymmetric information,
the agent may report untruthfully in period 1 a higher taste shock. In other words,
a “low type” may masquerade as a “high type” so as to increase his utility. This
agency problem is worsened by the lack of self-control, but the agent is aware of it,
i.e. sophisticated, so that he prefers a contract which counteracts at least partly his
lack of self-control by penalizing date-2 consumption when a high liquidity shock is
reported in period 1. As in Jacklin (1987), the agent can secretly store money bet-
ween periods at the same rate of return as the principal.We later extend this model
to an infinite horizon with repeated shocks.
Our work unveils two marked differences depending on whether the agent is time-
consistent or time-inconsistent. First, when the agent is time-inconsistent, there
is still a role for multi-period contracts even when hidden storage is allowed. By
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contrast, a time-consistent agent would insure against unobservable shocks but the
principal cannot provide such insurance if the agent can secretly store. Secondly,
in the presence of repeated shocks, the optimal allocation leads almost surely a
time-inconsistent agent to impoverishment whereas the time-consistent agent almost
surely accumulates wealth indefinitely. Such differences arise from the fact that the
lack of self-control changes the nature of the contract. Indeed, when the agent is
time-consistent, the optimal contract would transfer budget at the benefit of high
types, suffering from adverse liquidity shocks, as in a traditional insurance contract.
However, when the agent can secretly store money, no insurance is feasible so that
the constrained optimum is the laisser-faire situation with no budget transfer bet-
ween types. In contrast, when the agent is time-inconsistent, a transfer of resources
at the detriment of high types must be implemented to counter the tendency to
overconsume. The optimal contract is thus like a classical financial accounts, with
remunerated savings and costly borrowing. When lack of self-control is strong en-
ough, this contract is robust to hidden storage and leads individuals to immerisation
almost surely. Quite surprisingly, at the aggregate level, precautionary motives may
dominate and induce the population of such agents to accumulate aggregate savings.
More precisely, we show that this latter property holds when prudence is greater
than twice the risk aversion or, equivalently, when the inverse of the derivative of
agents’ utility function is concave.This result may seem paradoxical, and reflects a
strong increase in inequality : a vanishing fraction of individuals sees their wealth
increase while the rest of the population sinks into poverty, and this accumulation
of wealth among the best-offs is sufficient to more than compensate at the aggregate
level for the excessive indebtedness of the rest of the population.
The optimal contract for a time-inconsistent agent is strictly concave. Put diffe-
rently, the interest rate implicit in the optimal contract increases with the amount of
borrowing and decreases with savings. This result has multiple policy implications. It
supports the idea that progressive incentive schemes may be needed in order to cope
with time-inconsistency. In particular, this analysis can be applied to the optimal
design of a pension system when agents suffer from the temptation to overconsume.
When transfers between types are not allowed, Amador et al. (2006) show that the
optimal scheme relies on imposing a minimum level of savings. However, in most
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developed countries, contributions to pension schemes rather benefit from an incen-
tive mechanism that gradually decreases with the amount of money invested. Indeed,
retirement savings accounts generally provide for capped employer matching contri-
butions, and benefit from deferred taxation up to a certain contribution limit. Our
results show that these progressive incentive mechanisms are indeed part of the op-
timal commitment policy. This work admits reinterpretations beyond the realm of
intertemporal consumption smoothing, to situations where a continuum of agents
with heterogenous preferences do not internalize a positive externality generated by
the consumption of a “social good” such as education, R&D or vaccines. The conca-
vity of the optimal contract means in that case that more subsidies should be granted
for the early efforts. In particular, this supports, as conjectured by Amador et al.
(2006), paternalistic monetary incentives to schooling.
These results shed light on the process that leads to over-indebtedness and on po-
licy measures that are supposed to prevent it. We show that high interest rates induce
time-inconsistent consumers to accumulate unlimited debt, even if one may expect
high rates to keep some of them away from temptation. In other words, high interest
rates are not a strong enough commitment device to prevent impoverishment. Faced
with the problem of over-indebtedness, many States intervene by capping eligible
interest rates, but the effect of such usury laws on over-indebtedness is ambiguous:
it reduces the financial burden caused by high interest rates but, at the same time,
induces more borrowing and less precautionary savings. We show that capping in-
terest rates does not systematically prevent the immerisation of time-inconsistent
consumers, and even worsens this phenomenon for consumers with low risk aversion.
Usury laws alone can be ineffective in this regard, which calls into question the choice
of many developed countries to prohibit interest rates above a certain threshold.
2 Related literature
A new feature of the present study relative to the existing literature is that it
allows arbitrary resource transfers. Indeed, our two-period model is very similar to
the one considered by Amador et al. (2006), except that they consider a type-by-
type budget constraint while we allow resources to be transferred across types. Also,
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the infinite horizon model resembles to that in Atkeson and Lucas Jr (1992), except
that they limit the total consumption handed out in each period to a population
of time-consistent households while we allow intertemporal transfers among time-
inconsistent households. Those differences are crucial when analyzing the optimal
tradeoff between flexibility and commitment: whereas additional resources must be
targeted at agents facing a high liquidity shock, those agents must be latter penali-
zed in order to induce truthful reporting. Hence, the constrained optimum requires
transfer of resources among types and periods.
The natural benchmark is when the agent is time-consistent. Two different strands
of litterature provide important insights on that situation, whether you consider taste
shocks as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) or revenue shocks as in Townsend (1982).
According to these works, the agent insures against unobservable shocks by holding
a multiperiod contract that may, as shown by Thomas and Worrall (1990), lead him
almost surely to impoverishment in the presence of repeated shocks. However, if we
assume, as in Jacklin (1987) or Cole and Kocherlakota (2001), that the agent can
secretly store money between periods, no insurance can be provided anymore by
the principal: the agent only borrows and saves using risk-free bonds and, as shown
by Aiyagari (1994) and Chamberlain and Wilson (2000), almost surely accumulates
precautionary savings indefinitely. The model developed in this paper contains the
case of a time-consistent agent as a special case, and extends it to take into account
present-biased preferences.
Our results show that Thomas and Worrall’s impoverishment result still holds
when hidden storage is allowed, as long as the lack of control is strong enough. This
reconciles the initial view that hyperbolic discounting leads to undersavings (Laibson,
1997) with the result of Salanié and Treich (2006) showing that hyperbolic consumers
may either oversave or undersave when knowing that they will suffer from lack of
self-control in the future. In this latter work, sophisticated consumers can only alle-
viate their time-inconsistency by saving more. When such consumers have access to
commitment devices, our work shows that a population of time-inconsistent house-
holds will on average accumulate aggregate debts or savings, depending on the same
criteria of prudence identified by Salanie and Treich. However, those households will
nevertheless almost surely become over-indebted whatever their prudence, whereas
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time-consistent consumers almost surely accumulate wealth, which is consistent with
the initial intuition of Laibson.
This work is related to the large literature that deals with the policy implication of
time-inconsistency. Regarding savings for retirement, we know since Diamond (1977)
that a paternalistic intervention may be required to counter behavioral biases. As
mentioned in the introduction, our work refines the result of Amador et al. (2006)
by allowing transfer between types and across periods. This provides a theoretical
justification for the saving accounts put in place in most developed countries, based
on a decreasing incentive mechanism resulting from tax reliefs and employer mat-
ching contributions. Galperti (2015) addresses this issue when time inconsistency is
unobservable. He allows also for transfer between types, but assumes that the se-
cond period’s utility is linear, which implies that no tension initially arises between
commitment and flexibility (as we show subsequently in proposition 1). Such ten-
sion occurs in his work once he assumes unobservable time-inconsistency, inducing
adverse selection. In order to screen between time-consistent and time-inconsistent
consumers, less flexibility must be provided to the latter.
Regarding consumer credit, the fact that present-biased individuals have signifi-
cantly higher amounts of credit card debt have been observed empirically (Meier and
Sprenger, 2010). However, the literature is quite scarce on how to counter the over-
indebtedness that time-inconsistency is likely to generate. To our knowledge, our
work is the first to address this issue from a theoretical point of view, and to analyze
the effectiveness of two distinct approaches: self-control by means of commitment
devices (generating high interest rates) and credit regulation with usury law (which
instead lower interest rates). According to Glaeser and Scheinkman (1998), usury
laws may reduce inequalities by limiting transfers between borrowers and lenders:
our work question this analysis by showing that, in the end, such laws can worsen
impoverishment and widen inequalities.
Our result matters also for a social planner who has a higher discount factor than
individuals, because he values more future generations. Farhi and Werning (2007)
have looked at such a problem except that, consistent with the framework of Atke-
son and Lucas Jr (1992), they consider a pure redistributional issue, and thus do not
allow transfer among generations. In Atkeson and Lucas’s framework, the degree of
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inequality continually increases: individuals individuals almost surely become infini-
tely poor, whereas a vanishing fraction of the population still accumulates wealth.
We obtain a similar result for time-inconsistent agents when transfer between types
and across periods are allowed. By contrast, Farhi and Werning show that, when
the social planner uses a more patient geometric discounting, a steady state solution
exists with no one trapped at misery. More specifically, they consider an economy
populated by a continuum of individuals who live for one period and are replaced
by a single descendant in the next, and assume that the social planner values future
generation, so that the social discount factor α̂ is higher than the private one α. In a
two-period economy, this model is similar to ours. 1 Our work shows that, apart when
utility functions are logarithmic, transfers among generations may enhance alloca-
tive efficiency. When there are more than two periods, the models differ in how the
principal and the agent disagree on discounting (i.e. more or less patient geometric
discounting, or geometric vs. quasi-hyperbolic discounting), and this is enough to
induce very different long-term properties in the presence of repeated shocks. 2
3 A model of insurance for time-inconsistent agents
We analyze the optimal 3 allocation of consumption in the presence of liquidity
shocks when consumers are time-inconsistent, with a quasi-hyperbolic parameter β.
Utility functions in the two periods of consumption (t = 1, 2) are u and w respectively.
There is a single consumption good available in each period. We impose a subset of
the Inada conditions,i.e. utility functions are smooth, increasing, strictly concave
1. The discounting rules are the same once we identify period 1 and period 2
consumption with parent’s and child’s consumption, and set α̂ = δ and α = βδ. They
focus partly on the case of logarithmic utility and we show that transfer across periods
is not part of the solution in that case, so that the respective optimal allocations of
the two models coincide exactly under that assumption and when considering only
two periods.
2. In Farhi and Werning’s work (resp. in our work) agents at period 1 put a
geometric α2 = β2δ2 (resp. a quasi-hyperbolic βδ2) weight on period-3 consumption.
3. Equilibrium contracts are socially optimal because we assume sophisticated
present-biased agents and perfectly competitive financial markets.
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and such that the limit of their derivative at 0 and ∞ are respectively ∞ and 0.
The consumer faces in the first period a liquidity shock θ > 0 in a bounded interval
Θ = [θ, θ̄], with a distribution represented by a continuous distribution function f(θ).
We assume f > 0 and denote by F (θ) the corresponding cumulative distribution
function. The average shock is normalized to one, i.e.
∫
θf(θ) = 1. The liquidity
shock is privately observed at date 1 by the consumer, who contracts at date 0 with





(θu(c(θ)) + w(k(θ)))f(θ) (EU)
where c and k denote the first and second period’s consumptions respectively, subject
to incentive compatibility constraints :
θu(c(θ)) + βw(k(θ)) ≥ θu(c(θ′)) + βw(k(θ′)) ∀θ, θ′ (IC)
and some budget constraint that remains to be specified. The financial intermediary
can invest 1 at t = 1 to get at t = 2 return δ−1 ≥ 1. The allocation defines a type-
contingent budget function B(θ) = c(θ)+δk(θ). In contrast with Amador et al. (2006)
who consider a type-by-type budget constraint (B(θ) ≤ y), and with Atkeson and





k(θ)f(θ) ≤ e2), we follow Diamond and Dybvig (1983) in considering a global
budget constraint that allows transfer of resources between types and across periods:∫
(c(θ) + δk(θ))f(θ) =
∫
B(θ)f(θ) ≤ y (BC)
We consider in the following the optimization problem (M) maximizing the expec-
ted utility (EU) under the constraints (IC) and (BC). An allocation (or contract)
{c(θ), k(θ)} is said to be admissible if it satisfies the constraints.
The first-best contract, when taste shocks are not private information, equalizes





(k(θ)) = constant ∀θ. (1)
This is an insurance mechanism that allocates higher consumption to individuals
facing liquidity shocks in period 1, while consumption in period 2 is type-independent.
When shocks are privately observed, consumers are tempted to report a high shock
8
and consume more immediately. In order to prevent that, lower consumption in
period 2 must be allocated to reported high types.
Regarding the constrained optimum, a useful benchmark is when the second
period’s utility is linear, i.e. w(k) = wk. In this case, reallocating period-2 consump-
tion among types has no impact on the expected utility. One can choose period-1
consumption to satisfy the condition (1) of the first-best contract, and pick period-2
consumption in order to respect the budget constraint (BC) subject to the incentive
compatibility constraints (IC). It is then easy to see that the optimal contract is a
first-best contract in which period-2 consumption is chosen such that c(θ)+βδk(θ) is
constant. It is like a financial contract in which additional resources, used in period
1 by the consumer facing a high liquidity shock θ, must be paid back with interest in
period 2. More precisely, time-inconsistency can be perfectly corrected by a fixed in-
crease in interest rate from 1/δ−1 to 1/βδ−1. In a consumption-savings framework,
with a competitive intermediary providing credit cards, the increase of interest rate
must be offset by a fixed increase in consumption or, equivalently, by lowering credit
card’s fixed fees. We get therefore the following proposition which is a generalization
of the result obtained by DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004), who assume that both
u and w are linear.
Proposition 1. When the second period’s utility function is linear, time-inconsistency
has no impact on welfare, as it can be perfectly corrected by an increase of interest
rate i.e. a return 1/βδ above the technological rate of return 1/δ.
However, as soon as the second period’s utility is strictly concave, a lack of self-
control makes it more difficult to induce truthful reporting: incentives must be streng-
thened and the constrained optimum moves away from the first-best contract when
time-inconsistency increases:
Proposition 2. When w is strictly concave, the expected utility provided by the opti-
mal contract strictly decreases when time-inconsistency increases (i.e. β decreases).
4 Optimal transfer of resources
The objective of this section is to understand how lack of self-control constrains
the allocation of resources among types, and in particular what type of resource
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transfer among types is implemented by the optimal contract {c(θ), k(θ)}. We will
see that, under fairly general assumptions, the budget function B(θ) = c(θ) + δk(θ)
is monotonic. An increasing budget function means that a transfer of resource is
made for the benefit of consumers suffering from adverse shocks, as in a traditional
insurance contract. In contrast, a decreasing budget function B(θ) means that the
money granted during a liquidity shock will have to be repaid later with additional
interest charges. With a slight abuse of langage, we say that the contract is an
“insurance” contract when the budget function is increasing, and a “credit” contract
when it is decreasing. In practice, the latter contract is similar to a classic individual
financial account offered by banks, with a return on savings and a charge on loans
higher than the risk-free rate of return available on the market. An insurer’s contract
pools risks by transferring resources to consumers facing an adverse (liquidity) shock
whereas, as shown by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), such a banking contract is another
way to provide insurance liquidity to consumers.
Equivalently, the optimal allocation is characterized by the slope of the menu
K defined by the relation K = k(c−1(.)) on the domain spanned by c. In the
consumption-savings framework presented above, this slope reflects the marginal cost
of borrowing as well as the marginal return on saving: if the consumer borrows and
consumes at period 1 an additional dc, he will have to reimburse −dk at the second
period, and thus pay an interest rate equal to −dk/dc− 1. Accordingly, a contract is
an “insurance” (resp. “credit”) type contract iff the derivative of K is higher (resp.
lower) than the slope −1/δ corresponding to the technological rate of return. When
consumers are time-inconsistent with a second-period linear utility, we have seen
with the Proposition 1 in section 2 that the slope of the curve K(c) is constant and
equal to −1/βδ: the consumer can perfectly correct his lack of self-control with a
constant premium on his saving and borrowing interest rate. Thus, this constrained
optimum is a so-called ”credit” contract whereas, as seen in the previous section, the
first best is an ”insurance contract” that equalizes marginal utilities.
4.1 Optimal contract without hidden savings
We follow thereafter an intuitive approach, by using perturbations of the optimal
allocation {u(θ), w(θ)} that maximizes the Lagrangian associated with the budget
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constraint. Detailed proofs of the results are provided in the mathematical appendix.
As usual, and with a slight abuse of notation, it is convenient to change variables
from c(θ) and k(θ) to u(θ) = u(c(θ)) and w(θ) = w(k(θ)), and to consider the state






). When those functions
are differentiable, the constraints (IC) are equivalent to u(θ) non-decreasing and
θu
′
(θ) = −βw′(θ). In the following, we drop the constraint “ u(θ) non-decreasing ”,
and use simple perturbations that satisfy the relation
θu
′
(θ) = −βw′(θ). (2)
First, we can get the so-called “ transversality conditions ” associated with the
maximization problem by using perturbations at the two ends of the interval Θ. In-
deed, when θ = θ or θ̄, we can slightly change the optimal allocation in an incentive
compatible way by adding θε to w(θ) and substracting βε from u(θ) for ε infinitely
small. The expected utility is then increased by (1−β)θε whereas the overall budget
increases by δθε/w
′
(k(θ))−βε/u′(c(θ)). Those two terms must be equal, up to a po-













= λ−1(1− β−1)θ for θ = θ, θ̄. (3)
Those conditions give us the marginal transfer of resources dB(θ) that must be
implemented by the optimal contract at the two ends of the interval Θ in order to
provide an additional unit of utility du(θ) to type θ+ dθ. This transfer is zero when
β = 1 and strictly negative when β < 1.
We can similarly derive the Euler-Lagrange equation. We consider the pertur-
bation starting at θ ∈ Θ defined by wε(θ̃) = w(θ̃) + εθIθ̃≥θ and uε(θ̃) = u(θ̃) −
βεIθ̃≥θ. This perturbation is incentive compatible, and equivalent to kε(θ̃) ' k(θ̃) +
εθIθ̃≥θ/w
′
(k(θ̃)) and cε(θ̃) ' c(θ̃)− βεIθ̃≥θ/u
′

















Those two terms must be equal up to the budget multiplier λ. Differentiating twice















[F (θ) + (1− β)θf(θ)] . (4)
By integrating this Euler-Lagrange equation, and using the tranversality conditions,
we get as well the so-called inverse Euler equation (cf. mathematical appendix for a
detailed proof). This relation reflects that one cannot improve the solution through
a fixed transfer of utility from one period to the other,and can also be obtained with











































If u(θ) is non decreasing, then w
′
(k(θ)) is non-decreasing with expected value equal





is an increasing then decreasing (resp. concave) function of θ. Besides, we




(θ̄) are both zero when
β = 1, and both negative when β < 1.
Thus, when the distribution of shock f is uniform, the budget function B(.) is
increasing when β = 1, and that it is decreasing outside a sub-interval (where it is
non-decreasing) when β < 1. It is also shown in the appendix that the constrained
optimum tends to the optimal bunching solution (c∗, k∗) when β tends to zero. This




(k∗). The derivative of the implementation
curve K′(c(θ)) = −θu′(c(θ))/βw′(k(θ)) is then asymptotically equivalent to −θ/βδ
when β tends to zero. This implies that the budget function is decreasing when β is
small enough.
We extend this result in the mathematical appendix to any distribution of shocks
with a positive density f(θ) on the interval [θ, θ̄]. More precisely, we show the fol-
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lowing proposition once we assume the existence of optimal solutions u(θ) to the
maximization problem that are piecewise-C1: 4
Proposition 3. There exists a unique optimal solution to the maximization problem
(EU) under constraints (IC) and (BC), and it satisfies the following properties:
(i) When β = 1, the optimum transfers resources to high types, i.e. the budget
function B(.) is increasing (insurance contract) ;
(ii) When β is small enough, the optimal allocation transfers resources to low types,
i.e. the budget function is decreasing (credit contract), and the implementation
curve K(c) is strictly concave.
Thus, when consumers are time-consistent, the constrained optimum induces a
positive transfer of resources in favor of types who face high shocks, and is an ‘insu-
rance’ contract, according to the terminology defined at the beginning of this section.
By contrast, when lack of self-control is strong enough, a transfer of resources at the
detriment of high types must be implemented: the optimal allocation is a ‘credit
contrat’, in the sense defined previously, that allows individuals to borrow at a pre-
mium over the market rate.
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 3 for a uniform distribution of shocks, and gives
an estimate of the threshold value that induces a switch from insurance to credit. 5
This threshold appears to be quite high, close to 0.95, and much higher than em-
pirically estimated values of time-inconsistency, such as β = 0.7 in Angeletos et al.
(2001) or β = 0.5 in Laibson et al. (2007). This threshold cannot be explicited in
general, but we provide an upper bound in subsection 5.2 when there are only two
4. This assumption is made in similar settings, such as in Athey et al. (2005)
and Halac and Yared (2014). When the distribution of shock is uniform, existence
and smoothness of the optimal solution are rigorously proven in the mathematical
appendix. In that case, we show that the monotonicity constraint on u(θ) is not
binding. In the general case of a non-uniform shock, existence is trickier to prove
because the monotonicity constraint can be binding. This cannot be achieved with
the classic tools of optimal control theory, and has been addressed for some specific
cases, cf.Rochet and Choné (1998) and Carlier (2001).
5. Those pictures are obtained by solving numerically the maximization problem
when u(c) = (1+c)
1−γ
1−γ and w = δu, with γ = 7 and δ = 0.957 following ibid.
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shocks. Figure 2 illustrates result (ii) of Proposition 3 when the distribution is a
normal one. In that case, the constraint  u(θ) non-decreasing  (or, equivalently,
c(θ) non decreasing) appears to be binding at the left side of the interval [θ, θ̄].
This confirms, as explained previously, that the corresponding problem is an opti-
mal control problem for which admissible solutions are required to be convex, which
requires an additional assumption of existence, and a more rigorous proof which is
given in the mathematical appendix.
.


























































Figure 1 – Budget function B(θ) with a uniform distribution of shocks









































Figure 2 – Example in which the non-decreasing-consumption constraint is
binding over some interval (normal distribution of shocks with β = 0.7)
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4.2 Optimal contract with hidden savings
In the spirit of Jacklin (1987), it may be more realistic to assume that consumers
can store money between periods at the same rate of return as the principal. We
consider truthful mechanisms that satisfy a more stringent incentive compatibility
constraint, with ‘Hidden Savings’:
θu(c(θ))+βw(k(θ)) ≥ θu(c(θ′)−δ∆)+βw(k(θ′)+∆) ∀θ′ ,∀∆ ∈ [0, c(θ′)/δ] (ICHS)
This new constraint implies that B(θ) is non-increasing: if B(θ
′
) > B(θ) for θ
′
> θ,
then type-θ would report untruthfully type-θ
′
and save between periods ∆ = (c(θ
′
)−
c(θ))/δ, and this incentive compatibility constraint does not hold. The contract must
therefore be a ‘credit contract’: borrowing must be costly in order to prevent consu-
mers from asking more money at period 1 and saving afterward.
The following proposition describes the optimal allocation for the two polar cases,
time-consistent consumer and strongly hyperbolic consumer:
Proposition 4. When β = 1, there is no transfer of resources among types: the op-
timal solution of the maximization problem (EU), under budget constraint (BC) and
incentive compatibility constraint with hidden savings (ICHS), is such that B(θ) = y
for all θ ∈ Θ. When β is small enough, the hidden storage constraint is not binding
so that the solution is the optimum defined in the Proposition 3 (credit contract).
Thus, it would be optimal to provide more resources to a consumer facing high
liquidity shocks but agents’ ability to secretly store prevents that. When β = 1, no
resources are transferred among types at the optimal allocation, which is equivalent
to a bunching solution where the principal lends the maximum amount of money that
the agent would be willing to borrow, with no premium on interest rates. This result
extends Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) to the case of a continuum of liquidity shocks.
When β is small enough, the optimal contract in the absence of hidden savings only
allows individuals to borrow and to lend at some contractual interest rates high
enough to deter agents to secretly store money. Figure 3 summarizes in a simple
way those results (the middle graph is provided as an illustration but, depending on















Figure 3 – Budget function B(θ) with hidden storage
4.3 Interpretation and policy implications
As in Amador et al. (2006), these results provide a better understanding of the
optimal design of individual pension accounts. Households generally use dedicated
retirement savings systems, while also being able to save in other financial instru-
ments. This is the framework considered in the previous section with hidden savings.
When agents are time-consistent, we show that no insurance is feasible and that the
constrained optimum is the laisser-faire situation: households save and borrow freely
at the market rate, without relying on a more sophisticated financial contract. On
the other hand, when household are time-inconsistent enough, incentives are needed
to penalize those who do not save enough and to reward prudent savers. The conca-
vity of the implementation curve means that the incentive to invest in a retirement
account must be stronger for the first dollar saved.
When transfers between types are not allowed, Amador et al. (2006) show that the
optimal scheme relies on imposing a minimum level of savings. However, most pension
plans do not impose such a constraint, but instead offer a decreasing incentive system,
often with a maximum ceiling on the amounts of eligible savings. 6 For instance,
regarding the US defined-contribution pension account 401(k) plans, employees can
opt-out, are subject to maximum contribution limits, with capped employer matching
6. According to OECD (2019), all OCDE countries use progressive financial incen-
tives (tax and non-tax incentives, usually a mix of deferred taxation and matching
contribution, with a maximum cap) to encourage individuals to save for retirement,
whereas minimum savings requirement are present in five countries (Iceland, Korea,
Lithuania, New Zealand and Norway).
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contributions, and benefit from the progressivity of taxation by defering pay until
retirement. Federal employees benefit from a similar scheme (the Thrift Savings
Plan) with a declining contribution from the employer: the first 3% of employee
contribution is matched dollar-for-dollar, while the next 2% is matched at 50 cents
on the dollar. We show that these pension systems correspond well in form and
principle to the theoretically optimal design when agents suffer from the temptation
to over-consume.
More generally, the concavity property means that the contractual interest rate
on borrowing (resp. return on savings) increases with the amount of borrowing (resp.
decreases with the amount of savings). The intuition behind this result is that, at
the constrained optimum, the marginal utility is higher for consumers facing higher
liquidity shocks. In order to induce truthful reports, this must be offset by a higher
contractual interest rate, i.e. a higher penalty when an individual is under-saving or
over-borrowing. This result applies also to consumer credit. In this case, the concavity
of the optimal contract means that the interest rate should ideally increase with
the size of the loan, regardless of the level of risk induced on the lender, in order
to alleviate the behavioral bias. To analyze the implications in terms of consumer
credit, a model with repeated borrowing is necessary. This is addressed in section
5.2.
These results admit reinterpretation beyond the realm of intertemporal consump-
tion smoothing. The model considered in section 4.1 also captures the optimal Pi-
govian taxation of an agent who consumes two goods: an ordinary consumer good
whose utility differs among agents, and a social good that generates a positive exter-
nality. Let’s consider a population of agents indexed by θ whose utility is given by
θu(c) + βw(k), whereas the externality generated by the consumption of the good k
is given by (1 − β)w(k). A social planner does internalize the externality, and thus
maximizes the utilitarian welfare criterion
∫
(θu(c) + w(k))f(θ). 7 When β = 1, the
contract K(c) describes the optimal taxation when the presence of non-observable
7. In this case, there is no intertemporal transfer, hence δ = 1. If an agent consumes
an additional fraction dk of the social good, the optimal contract induces him to
consume −dc = −dk/k′(c) less of the ordinary good. This reflects a marginal Pigo-
vian subsidy equal to −dc/dk − 1.
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shocks induces a need for redistribution, in the absence of externalities. We saw in
section 4.1 that the slope of the budget function B is zero at θ = θ, θ̄, a result si-
milar to the classical Mirrleesian property of non-distortion at the top and at the
bottom (Seade, 1977). When β > 1, the contract K(c) describes the corrective taxa-
tion implementing the optimal trade-off between the redistributive and the corrective
objectives of taxation. The concavity of K(c), stated in Proposition 3, means that
the optimal Pigovian subsidy should be decreasing per unit of social good when the
externality is strong enough. This applies to environmental public policy, but also
to paternalistic regulation. For instance, consider the case of low-altruism parents
who put a low weight β on the education k of their own children. As conjectured
by Amador et al. (2006), our result shows that a paternalistic government should
provide schooling subsidies that decrease with the amount of educational expenses.
5 Asset accumulation and overindebtedness
5.1 Aggregate asset accumulation
Prudent consumers generally save money when they face uncertainty (Gollier,
2001). In a deterministic framework, time-inconsistency may induce under-saving
(Phelps and Pollak, 1968). When a population of agents faces both uncertainty and
inconsistency, the aggregate level of savings and debt reflects the combined effect of
these two factors.
We investigate whether uncertainty induces a population of time-inconsistent
households to save money or accumulate debts. We assume w = δu so that, in
the absence of shocks, consumption would be the same in both periods. Thus, in
our framework, the intertemporal transfer T =
∫ θ̄
θ
(c(θ) − k(θ))f(θ)dθ reflects the
aggregate level of net wealth (T positive means that households borrow money on
average in order to face uncertainty). The following proposition provides answers to
the above mentioned questions when β is small enough. This limit property is derived
from the inverse Euler equation (5): consumption varies more at the second period
than at the first period, and the result follows in the limit. We provide at the end of
section 5.2 a more direct proof with an explicit condition for β small when there are
only two discrete shocks.
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Proposition 5. When lack of self-control is strong enough, a population of hyperbolic
consumers issue aggregate debt if 1/u
′




In other words, precautionary motives dominate at the aggregate level if 1/u
′
is concave. 8 In this case, the intertemporal transfer T is negative, which reflects
aggregate savings at period 1. This is reminiscent of the result of Rogerson (1985) on
repeated moral hazard which states that the wages paid by a risk neutral principal
to a population of risk averse agents either increase or decrease over time, depending
on the curvature of the inverse of agents’ marginal utility of income. It also echoes
the result of Salanié and Treich (2006) who show that the same criteria determine
whether time-inconsistent consumers under- or over-save when they know that they
will suffer from a lack of self-control. In their three-period model, consumers can
only alleviate their time-inconsistency by saving more at the first period whereas we
allow here consumers to contract with a financial intermediary (as we will see in the
next section, this result also extends to an infinite horizon model).
5.2 Overindebtedness
The previous section looked at the accumulation of debts and assets at the ag-
gregate level of an entire population. In this section, we are concerned with long-run
inequality and immerisation at the individual level. We follow assumptions used by
part of the literature dealing with these questions (in particular Atkeson and Lu-
cas Jr (1992) and Halac and Yared (2014)) that is, we consider two shocks θh > θl,
and assume that consumers have a constant relative risk aversion.
We thus consider a discrete-type model with repeated i.i.d. shocks in {θl, θh} over
an infinite horizon. The respective probabilities are πl and πh with πl + πh = 1, the
8. This condition can be interpreted in term of prudence. The measure of prudence
P follows the definition of Kimball (1990), i.e. P (c) = −u′′′(c)/u′′(c). The concavity
of 1/u
′
is equivalent to P ≥ 2A, where A is the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion
defined by A(c) = −u′′(c)/u′(c). This criteria is commonly used in classical risk
theory, that shows that a (time-consistent) consumer facing risk accumulates money
iff P ≥ 0 when the risk cannot be avoided, or iff P ≥ 2A when he can adapt by
choosing the amount of risk (Gollier, 2001).
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average taste shock is equal to 1, that is πlθl + πhθh = 1. The felicity function is u in
each period. We denote by θ̂t = (θ1, θ2, ..., θt) the history of shocks up to time t. For
any x ∈ {l, h}, with a slight abuse of notation, we set (θ̂t, θx) = (θ1, θ2, ..., θt, θx) the
history of shocks θ̂t enriched by the additional shock θx at the subsequent period.
We use similar notation convention with (θx, θ̂
t) and (θ̂t, θx, θ̂
t′). An allocation of a
given budget y is a function that maps shock’s report θ̂t to consumption c(θ̂t), and
such that the budget constraint (BC) is satisfied, that is Σ∞t=0E[δ
tc(θ̂t)] converges to
a real number not greater than y. The optimal allocation maximizes the expectation





under the budget constraint (BC), and incentive compatibility constraints with hid-
den savings
θxu(c(θ̂
t, θx)) + βδU
0(θ̂t, θx) ≥ θxu(c(θ̂t, θx′)− δε) + βδU ε(θ̂t, θx′) (ICHS2)
for any non-negative integer t (t = 0 meaning that there is no past history θ̂t), for
any θ̂t, any x, x′ ∈ {l, h} and ε ≥ 0, where U ε(θ̂t, θx) denotes the highest future
expected utility the consumer can get after period t+ 1 by first reporting θ̂t then θx,
and consuming an additional ε at period t+ 1 and/or in subsequent periods (that is,
by storing money at the same rate of return as the principal). 9
In line with the dynamic programming literature, we call this maximization pro-
gram the sequence problem (SP) and consider the corresponding functional equation
V∞ = maxE[θxu(cx) + δV∞(kx)] (FE)
where the maximum is taken over the two-period allocations {cl, ch} and {kl, kh} that
satisfy the corresponding budget and incentive compatibility constraints (detailed
9. Thus, U0(θ̂t, θx) is simply the expected utility provided at the next period after




′i))]. When ε > 0, since we consider
sophisticated consumers, we assume that they only consider future expected utilities
that can be reached through hidden savings when taking into account their own
lack of self-control. This means that the allocation that provides the expected utility
U ε(θ̂t, θx) must satisfy itself the corresponding incentive compatibility constraints.
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therafter). We have assumed that the continuation value depends only on the current
budget announcement, and we will show that this is indeed the case: we prove in
this section that solutions to (SP) and (FE) coincide, in accordance with Bellman’s
principle of optimality, by showing that they are the fixed point of the one-step
operator L providing the solution of the corresponding two-period maximization
problem, that is V∞ = L(V∞) = maxE[θiu(ci)+δV∞(ki)]. For a given concave utility
function v, this problem is similar to the one studied in the previous sections 3 and
4, but with two discrete shocks and w(.) = δv(.). It is defined thus by the following
maximization program.
L(v)(y) = max π(θhu(ch) + δv(kh)) + (1− π)(θlu(cl) + δv(kl)) (M2)
where the first and second period’s consumptions for type x ∈ {l, h} are denoted
respectively by cx and kx, subject to incentive compatibility constraints with hidden
storageθhu(ch) + βδv(kh) ≥ θhu(cl − δε) + βδv(kl + ε),∀ε ∈ [0, cl/δ] (ICh)θlu(cl) + βδv(kl) ≥ θlu(ch − δε) + βδv(kh + ε),∀ε ∈ [0, ch/δ] (ICl)
Note and subject to the budget constraint
π(ch + δkh) + (1− π)(cl + δkl) ≤ y (BC2).
The following lemma shows that this model exhibits the same property as seen before
in Proposition 4. It provides also (inverse) Euler equations, as well as an explicit
threshold for the hyperbolic discounting factor β under which the budget function
B(θ) is decreasing: 10
Lemma 1. In the two-type case with hidden storage, the optimal allocation is unique
and satisfies the following properties:
(i) When β = 1, no transfers of resources between types are needed, i.e. the bud-
get function B(θ) is constant, and the allocation satisfies the Euler Equations
10. We consider here only the polar case β = 1 and β < θl/θh for which clear-
cut results regarding long-term properties can be obtained. The in-between case
β ∈ [θl/θh, 1) is discussed more in detail in the appendix. As in the continuum model















(kh) + (1− π)v
′
(kl);
(ii) When β < θl
θh
, there is a transfer of resources from high to low types, i.e.

















(iii) when β < θl/θh (resp. when β = 1), the optimum is also the solution of the
similar problem in which the incentive compatibility constraint for high type is
relaxed, and the hidden storage condition is removed (resp. replaced by non-
increasing budget condition, i.e. ch + δkh ≤ cl + δkl).
We now consider consumers with a constant relative risk aversion, i.e. with utility
u(z) = auγ(z) where uγ(z) = z
1−γ/(1−γ) with γ 6= 1 and a > 0. 11 For any a > 0, the
operator L transforms the function auγ(z) in another utility function with the same
relative risk aversion. Thus, the function L(auγ(z)) can be written as f(a)uγ(z) where
f(a) is a real number. It defines a function f that satisfies the following properties:
Lemma 2. The function f has a unique fixed point a∗ which is the limit of the
sequence limn→∞ f
n(a) for any a > 0.
This gives the unique solution a∗uγ of the functional equation (FE). It is entirely
defined by its value for a given budget y, that we normalize to 1, and by the corres-
ponding two-period optimal allocation A∗ = (c∗x, k∗x)x=l,h for the problem L(a∗uγ)(1).
Similarly, any solution of the infinite horizon problem (SP) is a CRRA function, en-
tirely defined by its value for the budget y = 1 and the corresponding allocation.









It remains to show that A∞ is the unique optimal allocation solving the infinite
horizon problem (SP) for y = 1, and that solutions to (FE) and (SP) coincide. In
11. For the sake of simplicity, we rule out in this section the case γ = 1 which is
treated in the appendix, with identical results.
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other words, Bellman’s principle of optimality holds. This is a stated in the following
lemma: 12
Lemma 3. The infinite horizon problem has a unique solution V∞, corresponding to
the allocation A∞, and such that V∞ = L(V∞) = lim∞ Ln(uγ) = a∗uγ.
Let’s now consider the long-term properties of the optimal infinite-horizon al-
location. The remaining budgets after T periods are k(θ̂T ) = Πt=Tt=1 k
∗
θt . According
to lemma 1, the marginal utility V ′∞(k(θ̂
T )) (resp. the inverse of the marginal uti-
lity 1/V ′∞(k(θ̂
T ))) follows a martingale defined by the Euler equation when β = 1
(resp. by the inverse Euler equation when β < βl/βh). These martingale proper-
ties are similar to the ones obtained in the literature. More precisely, the relation
E(1/V ′∞) = 1/V
′
∞ derived from the inverse Euler equation in the case β ≤ θl/θh
corresponds to the case of incentive compatible contracts under information asym-
metry. This relation is similar to the one obtained for instance by Thomas and
Worrall (1990). The relation E(V ′∞) = V
′
∞ obtained in the case β = 1 is similar to
the martingales obtained in the context of self-insurance, as in Aiyagari (1994) and
Chamberlain and Wilson (2000).
This allows to characterize the long-run property of individual wealth, with a
striking difference between time-consistent and time-inconsistent agents.
Proposition 6. When consumer are time-inconsistent enough (β ≤ θl/θh), the op-
timal contract is a credit contract with costly borrowing, consumer’s wealth becomes
almost surely arbitrarily small, and inequality increases as an ever smaller fraction
of the population still accumulates wealth. Conversely, when consumers are time-
consistent (β = 1), there is no transfer of resources among types: households save
and borrow freely at the market rate, which leads them to almost surely accumulate
precautionary savings indefinitely.
As explained by the literature mentioned in the previous paragraph, the long-term
properties result from the fact that the optimal contract must spread continuation
values in order to induce truthful reports. Because of the martingale properties,
12. Thereafter, with a slight abuse of notation, we identify solutions of (FE) and
(SP) with the corresponding allocations for a budget normalized to one.
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this spread of continuation values requires either a downward or an upward trend
of the remaining budget. This can be classically obtained using Doob’s martingale
convergence theorem. We provide thereafter a more direct proof that clarifies this
intuition and that will be useful in the next section. The remaining budget k(θ̂T )
tends almost surely to 0 (resp. to∞) iff ln(k(θ̂T )) = Σt=Tt=1 ln(k∗θt) tends almost surely
to −∞ (resp. to ∞). This is true iff E[ln(k∗x)] = π ln(k∗h) + (1− π) ln(k∗l ) is negative
(resp. positive). 13 Let’s set h(z) = a∗u′γ(z) when β = 1, and h(z) = 1/(a
∗u′γ(z))
when β < θl/θh. Let’s set also g(z) = ln(h
−1(z)). The martingale relation derived
from the (inverse) Euler equations are equivalent to h(1) = πh(k∗h) + (1−π)h(k∗l ). In
the case β = 1, we have h(z) = a∗z−γ and g is strictly convex, so that 0 = g(h(1)) <
π ln(k∗h) + (1 − π) ln(k∗l ). Similarly, in the case β < θl/θh, we have h(z) = a∗zγ, the










= πk∗γl + (1− π)k
∗γ
h = 1 (6)
and the function g is strictly concave, so that we get the reverse inequality E[ln(k∗x)] <
0. This yields the result of proposition 6. The fact that, in the case β < θl/θh, an
ever smaller fraction of the population still accumulates wealth results from k∗l > 1.
This is a straightforward consequence of the inverse Euler equation, since k∗l > k
∗
h.
Similarly, the previous section can be interpreted more explicitly in the case of
discrete shocks by considering the expectation of k(θ̂T ), which reflects the aggregate
level of endowment at time T . It is equal to (E[k∗x])
T , and tends to∞ (resp. to zero)
iff πk∗h + (1− π)k∗l > 1 (resp. < 1), which is a consequence of relation (6) when risk
aversion is lower (resp. greater) than one. Thus, when β < θl/θh, and u is CRRA,
this gives a more direct proof ot the results of proposition 5.
This explicit approach allows to quantify the long-term properties of the optimal
allocation. Figure 4 presents such numerical results for two values of β. 14 The two
curves under the x-axis describe the per-period average expected decrease in wealth.
The two other curves, which cross the x-axis when relative risk aversion is equal to 1,
describe the average aggregate savings per-period. It provides a numerical confirma-
tion of the previous results: time-inconsistent consumers sink into over-indebtedness
13. This is a consequence of the central limit theorem that states the convergence
of the binomial distribution to the normal distribution.
14. Parameters are θl = 0.8, θh = 1.5, δ = 0.957 and πh = 2/7 (so that E[θ] = 1).
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almost surely (proposition 6) but a population of such consumers accumulates a net
positive wealth over time if they are prudent enough (proposition 5), the condition
of prudence being equivalent here for a CRRA consumers to a relative risk aversion
lower than 1. This simulation tends to indicates that the impoverishment trend is
significant for consumers with a low risk aversion, and becomes quite negligible for
consumers with a high risk aversion.
Aggregate savings with β=0.3
Aggregate savings with β=0.7
Immerisation trend with β=0.7












Figure 4 – Long-term behavior in terms of constant relative risk aversion
5.3 Usury laws
Faced with the problem of over-indebtedness, some States intervene for paterna-
listic reasons and implement usury laws that cap eligible interest rates. We discuss
the rationale of such laws in more detail in the next section. Our target here is to
answer the following question: is there a similar snowball effect leading to impo-
verishment when interest rates are capped, or does it prevent / limit it (which is
apparently the expected effect of these public policies) ?
A priori, the effect on over-indebtedness is ambiguous: usury laws reduce the
financial burden caused by high interest rates but, at the same time, lower rates
induce more borrowing and less precautionary savings. Of course, in the extreme, if
the usury rate is low enough, a credit contract cannot be provided and there is no
more impoverishment as stated in the second part of proposition 6. To be relevant,
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the question must be formulated in a more precise way: what happens when one
starts to constrain the interest rates with a usury constraint close to current caps
(e.g. between 20% and 30% for personal loans) ?
This question can be addressed by extending the model developed previously. We
need to restrict allocations so that, when asking more cash at a given period, the later
repayment does not correspond to an implicite rate higher than the usury interest





where {c∗x, k∗x}x=l,h is the two-period fixed-point allocation A∗ defined in section 5.2.
In the two-period model, a usury law is then equivalent to imposing the following
constraint
kl − kh < (1 +Ru)(ch − cl) (UL)
where Ru < R̄ is the usury interest rate.
We extend similarly the infinite-horizon model. More precisely, we require, for
any t and any θ̂t, that kl(θ̂
t)− kh(θ̂t) ≤ (1 +Ru)(c(θ̂t, θh)− c(θ̂t, θl)) where kx(θ̂t) =
Σ∞i=1Eθ̂i [δ
i−1c(θ̂t, θx, θ̂
i)] is the expected value of the budget allocated to subsequent
periods after the history {θ̂t, θx}. This extended infinite-horizon model is a priori
more complex than the one without usury constraints because the optimal allocation
may depend on the entire history of past reported shocks, and not only on the
continuation budget. Indeed, usury laws prevent the principal from penalizing the
debtor with a high interest rate. Instead, the principal may restrict future allocations -
for instance, by providing less flexibility in the future to a consumer borrowing money
today. Thus, the optimal allocation may depend on past reported shocks. Beside, it
is not necessarily unique, since there is a priori an infinite number of ways of reducing
the borrowing possibilities offered in the future so as to reduce the expected utility by
a certain amount (in other words, there may not exist recursive Markov equilibria).
More explicitly, this means that the optimal long-horizon allocation constrained by
usury laws is not necessarily obtained by iterating a two-period allocation, as it was
the case in the previous section regarding the optimal unconstrained allocation A∞.
We show that, in this framework, the answer to the previous question is negative
when the usury constraint is not too stringent: in that case, the optimal allocation
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depends only on the continuation budget and the immerisation trend still holds (and
can even be worsened as we will see thereafter):
Lemma 4. Note R̄ the implicit interest rate of the optimal infinite-horizon contract
for a time-inconsistent consumer (with β < θl/θh) in the absence of usury laws,
(i) If the usury interest rate Ru is close enough to R̄, the long-horizon problem
constrained by the usury law has a unique solution, corresponding to an alloca-
tion A†∞ = c†(.) , which is a stationary equilibrium obtained by iterating over









any sequence of shocks θ̂t.
(ii) When (i) is satisfied, the inverse of the marginal utility is a strict super mar-
tingale, and consumers accumulate almost surely unlimited debt, which is res-
pectively equivalent to E[1/u′γ(k
†
x)] < 1 and E[ln(k
†
x)] < 1.
We provide in the mathematical appendix an explicit sufficient condition, i.e. a
threshold R̃ such that lemma 4 holds when Ru ≥ R̃ . This condition is quite loose for
a wide set of parameters. In the example illustrated thereafter, we have R̄ = 50%,
R̃ = 15% and we choose Ru = 20%.
When relative risk aversion is less than or equal to 1, we are able to prove that
the immerisation trend is worsened, as stated in the following proposition. This
result is not obvious a priori: usury constraints should intuitively induce a narrowing
of the spread between the second-period remaining budgets, and a widening of the
spread between the first-period budgets, with an ambiguous impact on immerisation.
However, this comes up against the incentive compatibility constraint. One way to
comply to both constraints is to transfer budget from the second to the first period. 15
In other words, shifting more consumption up-front (regardless of shocks) is a way
to keep the incentives with a lower (implicit) contractual interest rate. This explains
why the ”snow-ball” effect of debt is worsened by usury laws.
Proposition 7. Under assumption of lemma 4, adding a usury constraint worsens
15. Because of the concavity of the utility function, adding ε > 0 to cl and ch, and
subtracting ε/δ to kl and kh, would decrease u(ch)−u(cl) and increase v(kl)− v(kh),
which relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint for low types.
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x are the second-
period optimal allocations for the problem with and without usury law respectively,
(i) when relative risk aversion is equal to one (logarithmic utility) ;
(ii) when relative risk aversion is lower than one, and liquidity shocks are small
enough.
Since expected shock is normalized to one, ‘small enough liquidity shocks’ means
that θl and θh must be close enough to one. This is very relative since (ii) is satisfied
in the example discussed thereafter and illustrated in Figure 6, based on θl = 0.8
and θh = 1.5.
The proof, illustrated in Figure 5, is slightly more complex than the intuition
presented in the previous paragraph. This figure describes the locus of second-period
consumptions {kh, kl} corresponding to different constraints. Initial wealth is norma-
lized to 1, utility is logarithmic, β is equal to 1/2, and the other parameters are the
same as in the example provided previously (cf. footnote 14). The point P = {k∗l , k∗h}
corresponds to the optimal allocation in the absence of usury constraint, and the
point P ′ = {k†l , k
†
h} to the optimal allocation with a usury constraint Ru = 20%.
The curve CI describes the set of points that exhibits the same immerisation trend
than the initial optimal allocation A∗, i.e. such that E[ln(kx)] = E[ln(k∗x)]. The curve
CM corresponds to martingale condition (6) arising from the inverse Euler equation,
that is E[1/u′γ(kx)] = 1. The curve CF represents the locus of points corresponding
to allocations satisfying the incentive compatibility constraint, as well as the budget
condition and another relation derived from first order conditions satisfied by an op-
timal allocation (detailed in the appendix). Those curves intersect at P and we need
to show that P ′ is strictly under the curve CI : this would mean that immerisation
trend is worsened by the usury constraint. As stated in lemma 4, the inverse of the
marginal utility is a strict super martingale, which is equivalent to P ′ strictly under
the curve CM . We also show in the appendix that P ′ is under the curve CF , and that
the curve CF (resp. CM) is steeper (resp. less steeper) than the curve CI . The result
follows.
Figure 6 illustrates what happens over time, with an additional example with
relative risk aversion equal to 0.5. The shaded areas show the growth of inequalities,
the upper (resp. lower) thin lines representing the evolution of wealth in the absence
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C_I : Immerisation trend
C_M : Super Martingale
C_F : Incentive compatibility
Figure 5 – Impact of usury law on second-period budget {kl, kh}. The curve CI is
slightly modified on the graph, with a less steep slope, in order to make visible the
way those curves intersect.
of negative shocks (resp. the worst cases when the individual is submitted to repeated
liquidity shocks). Solid (resp. dotted) lines correspond to the initial model without
usury law (resp. with usury law). The thick (solid and dotted) lines show the im-
merisation trend in both cases (measure, as explained previously, by E[ln(kx)]). We
see that it is very small when there is no usury law (about −0.02% per period when
γ = 1), and becomes much stronger under such law (about −0.63% per period).
Thus, borrowers are less penalized by interest rates in the presence of usury laws,
but this is not enough to prevent the snowball effect of over-indebtedness. Quite
the contrary in this example, the graph shows that individuals then save less in the
good states of nature (less precautionary savings when there is no liquidity shocks)
and become more impoverished in the bad states (more borrowings in presence of an
adverse liquidity shock). As explained at the end of section 5.2, it is also possible to
quantify the aggregate saving behavior characterized by proposition 5. When utility
is logarithmic, consistent with this proposition, there is no transfer across periods.
In the presence of usury law, on the contrary, the population goes into debt over
time: the aggregate debt increases by +0.60% per period. When γ = 1/2, usury
laws induce a trend reversal, from an upward trend in total wealth (+0.04%) to a
decrease at a rate of 2%. However, as illustrated by the top dotted lines, an ever
smaller fraction of the population still accumulates wealth.
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relative risk aversion = 1








relative risk aversion = 0.5
Figure 6 – Immerisation and growth of inequality with (dotted lines) and without
(solid lines) usury law with β = 0.5 (and other parameters as stated in 14).
5.4 Interpretation and policy implications
By building a bridge between different known results and by extending them
to time-inconsistent agents, this work shows that the lack of self-control radically
change long-run trend of consumption and indebtedness. We know, in particular since
Green (1987) and Thomas and Worrall (1990), that immerisation occurs when time-
consistent agents undertake contractual arrangements to insure against liquidity or
income shocks: consumer’s wealth becomes almost surely arbitrarily small. However,
as shown by Cole and Kocherlakota (2001), agents’ ability to secretly store money
prevents such incentive contracts. No insurance can be provided anymore: agents
only borrow and save using risk-free bonds and, as shown by Aiyagari (1994) and
Chamberlain and Wilson (2000), accumulate precautionary savings indefinitely.
Proposition 6 proves that, when agents are time-inconsistent enough, hidden sto-
rage does not constrain the optimal contract anymore, so that immerisation again
prevails. This property holds even when the population of consumers accumulates ag-
gregate savings over time, which is in particular the case for consumers with constant
relative risk aversion lower than 1 according to proposition 5. 16 This result may seem
16. The relevance of this result depends on the level of risk aversion encountered in
the population. Since we are considering here consumption and savings choice, the
most relevant analysis in our case are the ones based on micro-level data describing
household inter-temporal expenditure allocation. Those studies, like Blundell et al.
(1994) and Attanasio and Weber (1993), estimate an average intertemporal elasticity
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paradoxical - the corresponding case with time-consistent consumers was not consi-
dered by literature. 17 It reflects the fact that all those results hold almost surely. In
particular, whatever the level of relative risk aversion, inequality increases: a vani-
shing fraction of individuals sees their wealth increase while the rest of the population
sinks into poverty. In other words, when risk aversion is lower than one, the accu-
mulation of wealth among the best-offs is sufficient to more than compensate at the
aggregate level for the excessive indebtedness of the rest of the population.
Thus, although a high contractual interest rate serves as a commitment device
for restraining time-inconsistent consumers, it leads to poverty almost surely. It also
means that a sophisticated agent values the flexibility offered by a credit card enough
that he prefers to choose such an instrument, even if the long-term consequences are
impoverishment. This is not intuitive, and means that the negative consequences of
impoverishment are far enough away that the benefits of flexibility in the shorter
term outweigh them. What does this say about the behavior observed in practice ?
A large number of consumers frequently choose not to use a credit card: debit cards
are indeed now used more often than credit cards at the point-of-sale in the United
States according to Zinman (2009) and Borzekowski et al. (2008). Spending control,
for consumers suffering from a present bias, was initially seen as a potential motive
for giving up a credit card. Proposition 6 tends to refute this explanation - a sophisti-
cated agent with quasi-hyperbolic preferences prefers to keep the credit card. This is
consistent with the literature (ibid.), which now primarily explains the growth of de-
bit card transactions (to the detriment of other payment methods) by non-behavioral
reasons - in particular for purely pecuniary reasons.
Faced with the problem of over-indebtedness, many States intervene by capping
eligible interest rates. Such usury laws are indeed present in many developed coun-
of substitution for consumption slightly lower than one. The corresponding relative
risk aversion is greater than one for the majority of the population, but a significant
fraction appears to exhibit a risk aversion lower than unity.
17. Atkeson and Lucas Jr (1992) show that that immerisation occurs for for any
CRRA consumers, including those with risk aversion lower than one, but when there
is no money transfer across periods and no hidden savings. Thomas and Worrall
(1990) assume that the utility function u(c) satisfies inf u(c) = −∞ as well as
supu(c) <∞, which rules out CRRA with risk aversion lower than one.
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tries: this is the case in Japan, in most European countries, and in the US for some
types of loans. 18 However, the effect of those laws on over-indebtedness is ambiguous:
they reduce the financial burden caused by high interest rates, but lower rate induces
more borrowing and less precautionary savings. Proposition 7 shows that usury laws
can be ineffective in preventing over-indebtedness, and even worsen this phenomenon,
at least for consumers with low risk aversion. As explained in the previous section,
this results from the complex trade-off between flexibility and commitment, reflec-
ted in the contract chosen by the sophisticated time-inconsistent consumer. Capping
interest rates limits the incentives provided in the subsequent periods. It is then op-
timal to shift more budget for present consumption. This leads to less precautionary
savings (in the good states of nature), more borrowing (in the face of an adverse
liquidity shock) and, ultimately, more impoverishment.
Some important caveats must be considered when interpreting Proposition 7 in
this way. First, usury laws are generally justified by a paternalistic argument whose
underlying assumptions are not in our model, that is other cognitive biases such as
consumers’ naivety and financial illiteracy. Considering a naive rather than sophisti-
cated agent would not fundamentally change our results. 19 However, usury laws can
indeed prevent banks from taking advantage of their customers’ ignorance, or even
ban some forms of predatory lending as observed in the case of payday loans. Das-
gupta and Mason (2020) shows that capping annual interest rates of payday loans
at 36% in four US states led to a banishment of this industry. 20 Yet, they found
18. Usury laws are present in most European countries, but only a few have an ex-
plicit usury rate - France, Italy, Portugal and Switzerland according to Masciandaro
(2001) whereas price caps on short-term credits have been reintroduced in the UK
in 2014. In the US, credit cards were removed from usury law restrictions in a 1978
U.S. Supreme Court ruling, but high interest rate loans are still banned in 19 U.S.
states for specific loans such as payday loans.
19. A naive consumer would become even more easily over-indebted, with and wi-
thout usury laws, because of his lack of self control. This can be easily seen in our
model under the assumption of proposition 6: a naive and time-inconsistent agent
would choose the same contract as the time-consistent agent, and then report always
high liquidity shocks, which leads him to over-indebtedness.
20. In the absence of usury laws, payday loans charge a very large 14-day fee,
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no effect on bankruptcy: payday loan bans push borrowers into alternative forms
of finance, with lower interest rates, but the debt spiral seems unchanged which is
consistent with our results. 21 Second, and more importantly, as is done in the li-
terature on this topic, our immerisation result assumes that the spiral of debt can
drag individuals down to absolute misery. However, this is not realistic since there is
implicitly a threshold of over-indebtedness which is never exceeded, because one can
flee his country without repaying his debt or can benefit from a bankruptcy discharge
order. We leave that for further study, but we conjoncture that properties similar to
those stated in propositions 6 and 7 would still be valid in the presence of such a
mechanism. 22
With these caveats in mind, our result tends to show that usury laws are in-
sufficient, and can even be counterproductive, to prevent over-indebtedness. What
can be done otherwise to address over-indebtedness ? As mentioned in the previous
paragraph, another approach is to strengthen personal insolvency laws in order make
it easier for a debtor to qualify for a debt relief. However, it is less easy for a judge to
hold banks accountable for the insolvency of one of their customer when the infor-
mation on total household debt is not available to banks. This so-called ”positive”
information on debt is usually available through credit bureaus, in addition to ”ne-
gative” information such as late or missed payments but, in a lot of countries, the
collection of positive information requires the data subject’s consent, and some de-
veloped countries collect only negative data - in particular Danemark, France, Japan
and Spain according to Rothemund and Gerhardt (2011). Some countries, notably
France and Japan, both have banned interest rates above a certain threshold (close
to 20%) and forbid the collection of positive information on debt. Our work shows
that this type of consumer credit regulation can be highly counterproductive. 23
equivalent to annual interest rates of over 400%.
21. Desai and Elliehausen (2017) find a similar result. According to Bhutta et al.
(2016), consumers shift to other forms of credit with a lower but still very high
interest rate (such as pawnshop loans whose average rate is about 250%).
22. This would mean, more realistically, that agents do not gradually sink into ab-
solute misery but rather reach a level of over-indebtedness which leads to bankruptcy
with some probability, and benefit from a debt relief at the expense of the lender.
23. A gradual tightening of usury laws in Japan between 1986 and 2010 did not
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6 Conclusion
This paper shows how a lack of self-control changes the nature of optimal savings
and borrowing instruments. When the agents can secretly save, the impoverishment
result of Thomas and Worrall (1990) holds only when time-inconsistency is strong
enough. By contrast, time-consistent agents accumulate wealth indefinitely. Para-
doxically, the impoverishement of time-inconsistent agents holds even though, at the
aggregate level, precautionary motives may induce the population as a whole to save
money. Indeed, we show that if households are prudent enough, they accumulate
aggregate savings despite their lack of self-control. This reflects a strong increase
in inequality: the accumulation of wealth among the best-offs offsets the excessive
indebtedness of the rest of the population.
This work also characterizes optimal commitment schemes, leading to two dis-
tinct policy recommendations. First, it shows that a progressive incentive system is
always part of the optimum: the interest rate implicit in the optimal contract in-
creases with borrowing and decreases savings. Applied to the optimal design of a
pension scheme, this result supports incentive mechanisms that decrease with the
amount of money invested (such as tax-favored retirement savings accounts with
capped employer matching contributions, as is the case in most developed coun-
tries). As mentioned, this analysis can be applied as well to the Pigovian taxation
of externalities, and support for instance schooling subsidies that decrease with the
amount of educational expenses. Secondly, this analysis sheds light on the process
that leads to overindebtedness, and on some mechanisms supposed to prevent it. It
shows that neither commitment devices (such as high interest rates on credit cards,
prevent the boom in money-lending and over-indebtedness in this country. The ave-
rage level of outstanding debt per customer has been roughly halved at the end of
this period, but the main driver was a limit on total borrowing set by the money
lending law in 2006 (Gibbons, 2012). France’s regulation still prevents control on to-
tal borrowing and manage instead over-indebtedness. Laws were passed in 2013 and
2018 to respectively protect the fraction of the population deemed to be financially
fragile, then to facilitate debt renegotiation procedures. A high share of low income
households are barred from commercial borrowing, following a credit card or current
account delinquency.
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or precautionary reserves), nor usury laws (which, at the opposite, lower interest
rates on credit cards) suffice to prevent time-inconsistent households from accumula-
ting unlimited debt. Usury laws even worsen this phenomenon for consumer with low
risk aversion. To our knowledge, this is the first theoretical analysis of the impact on
over-indebtedness of usury laws, which are still in force in many developed countries.
An interesting direction for future research is to consider debt renegotiation process,
that partly prevent consumers from sinking into complete misery. Also, the need for
screening different types of consumers may modify the optimal contract. It would
be worth studying if these considerations have an impact on the long-run properties
discussed here.
The economic properties obtained in this work depend on some key parameters, in
particular the degree of risk aversion, the level of time-inconsistency, the stringency
of the constraint set by usury laws. Different forces are at play, and depending on the
parameters involved, some outweigh others. We show that, for commonly accepted
values of those key parameters, a clear conclusion can be obtained on these combi-
ned effects. An interesting direction for future research is to consider this from an
empirical point of view. Households are in particular heterogeneous with respect to
time-inconsistency and risk aversion. One can wonder whether these characteristics
explain the heterogeneity empirically observed with regard to financial services usage
and its consequence in term of credit card delinquency and personal bankruptcy.
7 Proof
Proof of Proposition 1: If w(z) = δ
′
z, the budget constraint (BC) will bind










/θ whereas, as explained in section 4.1, the incen-





which is equivalent here to k
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Therefore, when β < 1, the optimal allocation is the allocation that would be pro-
vided to a time-consistent consumer if the discount rate was distorted from δ to δβ
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(up to a fixed transfer of money balancing the global budget). 
Proof of Proposition 2: We show in what follows that, ∀β < β ′ , a consumer with
hyperbolicity β
′
enjoys more utility on average at the constrained optimum than a
consumer with hyperbolicity β. Let’s consider the optimal allocation (c∗, k∗) for the
consumer with hyperbolicity β, and define a new allocation (c, k) by c(θ) = c∗(θ) and
k(θ) = w−1(αw(k∗(θ)) + a) where α = β/β
′
and where the constant a is chosen such
that
∫









(θ) = −β ′w′(θ)k′(θ)
for a consumer with hyperbolicity β
′
. Therefore, in order to prove the proposition,
it is enough to show that∫
(θu(c∗(θ)) + w(k∗(θ)))f(θ)dθ ≤
∫
(θu(c(θ)) + w(k(θ)))f(θ)dθ.













The right term of this inequality can be rewritten as∫
w−1
(∫ (





and the result follows from the fact that w−1 is convex. This inequality is strict when
w is non-linear on the domain spanned by k∗(θ). 
Proof of Proposition 3 and 4: The intuitive underpinnings and the main ingre-
dients of the proof are given in the body of the text. A rigorous proof is given in
Mathematical appendix. 
Proof of Proposition 5: We know from results of section 4 that the storage
condition is not binding when β is small enough, and that the inverse Euler equation










For any function twice differentiable almost everywhere, we have∫ θ̄
θ




































and the result follows by choosing c = c̃. If we apply this property to the function
g = 1/u
′






















is increasing, the transfer T is positive iff the left term of this equation
is positive. When β tends toward zero, the optimal allocation tends to the bunching




tends uniformly to ∞. Consequently, when
β is small enough, the left term of the previous equation is positive if g is convex,
negative if g is concave. Since the second derivative of g = 1/u
′
is −u′′′/u′2+2u′′2/u′3,
the convexity of g is equivalent to −u′′′/u′′ ≤ −2u′′/u′ , i.e. the absolute prudence is
lower than twice the absolute risk aversion. 
Proof of Lemma 1: This extension of proposition 4 to the case of two discrete
shocks is proven in the mathematical appendix.
Proof of Lemma 2: We show in the following that the function f is convex
when γ < 1 and concave when γ > 1. When γ > 1, f non-decreasing is then a
consequence of the concavity of f and of the fact that f is strictly positive on R+.
When γ < 1, the optimal allocation solution to the problem L(auγ)(1) is still a
compatible allocation for the problem L((a + ε)uγ)(1) for ε positive. This implies
that L((a + ε)uγ)(1) ≥ L(auγ)(1) + εβδ(πhuγ(kh) + πluγ(kl)) ≥ L(auγ(1)) so that
f(a + ε) ≥ f(a), i.e. f is non-decreasing. In order to prove the lemma, it is then
enough to show that, for a small enough (resp. large enough), we have f(a) > a
(resp. f(a) < a), with lima→+∞ f(a) = +∞ and lima→0 f(a) ∈ R+∗. This is quite
straightforward, and results from the fact that lower (resp. upper) bound on L(auγ)
can be obtained from the bunching allocation (resp. from the problem where the
incentive compatibility constraints are relaxed) for which explicit formula can be














It remains to show the curvature property when β < θl/θh. It is enough to show
that this is true locally. Folllowing lemma 1(iii), we consider the relaxed problem in
which the hidden storage constraints and the incentive compatibility constraint for
high types are removed. Let’s choose a real ã > 0, a small positive number ε and λ ∈
[0, 1]. We set a0 = ã−(1−λ)ε and a1 = ã+λε. Thus, ã = λa0 +(1−λ)a1. We prove in
the following that L(ãuγ)(1) ≤ λL(a0uγ)(1)+(1−λ)L(a1uγ)(1). Since, by definition,
f(a) = (1−γ)L(a.uγ)(1), this implies the announced curvature properties of f . Let’s
consider an optimal allocations (c̃x, k̃x)x=l,h providing the maximal expected utility
for the two-period problem L(ãuγ) under the budget y = 1.
We slightly modify the allocation (c̃x, k̃x) in order to obtain admissible allocations
for the problems L(a1uγ)(1) and L(a0uγ)(1). More precisely, we consider allocations
defined by cx = c̃x + δε
′ and kx = k̃x − ε′ where ε′ is small, for x = k, l. Such
modification leaves the budget unchanged. These new allocations are admissible for
the problem L(a.uγ)(1), where a is a positive real number, with a binding incentive
compatibility constraint (ICl) iff h(ε
′) = a where
h(ε′) =
θl(uγ(c̃h + δε
′)− uγ(c̃l + δε′))
βδ(uγ(k̃l − ε′)− uγ(k̃h − ε′))
The function h is smooth and equal to ã at ε′ = 0. Besides, since uγ is concave,
ch > cl and kl > kh, we have h
′(0) < 0. Thus, we can locally invert this function and
set ε′i = h
−1(ai) for i = 0, 1. The corresponding allocations, defined by k
i
x = k̃x − ε′i
and cix = c̃x + δε
′
i, are respectively admissible allocation for the problems L(aiuγ)(1)
for i = 0, 1. This implies
λL(a0uγ)(1)+(1−λ)L(a1uγ)(1) ≥ λE[θxuγ(c0x)+δa0uγ(k0x)]+(1−λ)E[θxuγ(c1x)+δa1uγ(k1x)]
It remains to show that the right part of this inequality is greater than L(ãuγ)(1)
when ε is small enough. With a slight abuse of notation, we note O(ε) any function
which is bounded in the neighborhood of zero. The first-order Taylor expansion of h−1
is h−1(ã+ ε) = ε/h′(0) + ε2O(ε). Similarly, we can then write ε′0 = −(1− λ)ε/h′(0) +
ε2O(ε) and ε′1 = λε/h
′(0) + ε2O(ε). The first order approximation of the expected





which implies, since λε′0 + (1− λ)ε′1 = ε2O(ε),
λL(a0uγ)(1)+(1−λ)L(a1uγ)(1) ≥ L(ãuγ)(1)−δE[u′γ(k̃x)](λε′0a0 + (1− λ)ε′1a1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=λ(1−λ)ε2/h′(0)
)+ε2O(ε).
The desired inequality when ε is small enough then follows from h′(0) < 0. We have
thus proven the curvature property of the function f . 
Proof of Lemma 3: Using lemma 1(iii), classical reasoning detailed in the ma-
thematical appendix implies L(V∞) ≥ V∞ ≥ a∗uγ. If we set V∞ = a∞uγ, these
inequalities are equivalent to f(a∞) ≥ a∞ ≥ a∗ when γ < 1, and the reverse in-
equality when γ > 1. Properties of the function f , stated in lemma 2, implies then
a∞ = a
∗, so that lim∞ L
n(V∞) = V∞ = a
∗uγ. The unicity of the two-period optimal
allocation, stated in lemma 1, implies that the infinite horizon problem has a unique
solution that coincides with A∞. This proves the lemma. 
Proof of lemma 4: One of the key ingredient of the proof is to slightly modify
the one-step operator L considered in section 5.2 by allowing the possibility for
the principal to penalize the high-type utility at the second period (while keeping
the same high type’s second-period budget). More precisely, we consider two-period
allocations defined by consumptions {cx, kx}x=l,h and a non-negative penalty {zk}
for the second period utility of the high type consumer, and the one-step operator L̄
that solves the maximization problem on this set of allocations
L̄(v)(y) = max π(θhuγ(ch) + δ(v(kh)− zk)) + (1− π)(θluγ(cl) + δv(kl)) (M3)
such that zk ≥ 0, and under the budget constraint (BC), the usury constraint (UL)
and the following incentive compatibility constraints (enriched with possible penali-
zation):θhuγ(ch) + βδ(v(kh)− zk) ≥ θhuγ(cl − δε) + βδv(kl + ε),∀ε ∈ [0, cl/δ] (IC
′
h)
θluγ(cl) + βδv(kl) ≥ θluγ(ch − δε) + βδ(v(kh + ε)− zk),∀ε ∈ [0, ch/δ] (IC ′l)
This translates into a two-period model the possibility for the principal, mentioned
in section 5.3, to penalize the borrower by offering him less flexibility later. We show
in the mathematical appendix that, when Ru is close enough to R̄, there is no such
penalization (both in the two-period and the infinite-horizon optimal allocations),
the optimal contract constrained by the usury law depends only on the last reported
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shock and the remaining budget, and the properties stated in lemma 1, 2 and 3 of the
previous section hold with a slight difference: the inverse Euler equation is a strict
inequality, so that the inverse of the marginal utility is a strict super martingale.
Consequently, the arguments developed at the end of section 5.2 can be carried out:
the immerisation property still holds. 
Proof of proposition 7: We prove thereafter the case γ = 1 with u = ln(z). The
case γ < 1 is proven in the mathematical appendix using a similar method. When
the function v is also logarithmic, i.e. of the form v(z) = A ln(z) + B with A > 0,
it is easy to see that any optimal allocation of the two-period problems L(v) and














with ṽ(z) = ln(z)/(1 − δ), and that Lemma 1 and 3 still hold. We can then extend
easily the results presented in the core text to the case with logarithmic utility.
It remains to show that the optimum constrained by the usury law exhibits a
faster immerisation trend, which is equivalent to E ln(k†x) < E ln(k
∗
x) as explained at
the end of section 5.2. Inverse Euler equations established in lemma 1 and lemma




h + (1 − π)k∗l = 1. Let’s consider the graphs CI
and CM of functions fI and fM defined respectively by the conditions π ln(x) + (1−
π) ln(fI(x)) = E ln(k
∗
x) and πx + (1 − π)fM(x) = 1. Let’s also consider the graph
CF that represents for all kh the solutions kl of the system of equation defined by
budget constraint (BC), the incentive compatibility constraint (IC), and one of the
first order conditions derived in the mathematical appendix - cf. relation (19) -, i.e.
the system of equations 24
πch + (1− π)cl = 1− πδkh − (1− π)δkl (BC)
θl(ln(ch)− ln(cl)) = βδ(1− δ)−1(ln(kl)− ln(kh)) (IC)
θlkh − β(1− δ)−1ch + θhβ − θl = 0 (FOC)
This is illustrated in the figure 5 presented in the core text. Those curves intersect
at P = {k∗l , k∗h}. The immerisation trend is worsened, when the usury constraint Ru
24. It is easy to see that CF is smooth, with a most a unique kh for a given kl, and
at most two kl for a given kh. We are considering this curve locally around P .
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is added, iff P ′ = {k†l , k
†
h} is strictly under the graph CI . This is a consequence of the
following lemma proven in the mathematical appendix. 
Lemma 5. In the neighborhood of P,
(i) The graph CM is a curve that is decreasing with a less steeper slope than CI ;
(ii) The graph CF is a curve that is decreasing with a steeper slope than CI ;
(iii) The point P ′ defined by the usury-constrained optimal allocation is strictly un-
der the curves CM and CF .
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8 Online mathematical appendix (not for publication)
8.1 Supplementary material for section 4
8.1.1 Reformulation of the optimal control problem
We recall that the optimization problem (M) defined in the section 3 is to maxi-





(θu(c(θ)) + w(k(θ)))f(θ) (EU)
subject to a budget constraint that allows transfer of resources among types and
across periods ∫
(c(θ) + δk(θ))f(θ) =
∫
B(θ)f(θ) ≤ y (BC)
and to incentive compatibility constraints
θu(c(θ)) + βw(k(θ)) ≥ θu(c(θ′)) + βw(k(θ′)) ∀θ, θ′ (IC)
that may be enriched, as in subsection 4.2, in order to allow for hidden savings
θu(c(θ)) + βw(k(θ)) ≥ θu(c(θ′)− δ∆) + βw(k(θ′) + ∆) ∀θ′ ,∀∆ (HS)
We note u(θ) = u(c(θ)) and w(θ) = w(k(θ)), and consider the state variable
V (θ) = θu(θ)+βw(θ). It is easy to check that the incentive compatibility constraints
imply that u is non-decreasing and w is non-increasing. Besides, those functions are
bounded since they are defined over a closed interval. From the envelope property





tely continuous, and left- and -right-hand differentiable with derivative limθ± u(θ
∗(θ))
where θ∗(θ) ∈ argmax θu(θ′) + βw(θ′). The conditions “V absolutely continuous
with left- and -right-hand derivatives such that V
′±(θ) = limθ± u(θ)” together with
the condition “u non-decreasing” are then necessary conditions for incentive compa-
tibility. It is straightfoward that these conditions are also sufficient and, when u and
w are differentiable, that the first condition is equivalent to θu
′
(θ) = −βw′(θ).
The maximization problem can then be written as a classical constrained opti-
mization problem on the space X of convex and absolutely continuous real-valued
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functions V on the interval [θ, θ̄]. Since w(θ) = β−1V (θ) − β−1θu(θ), it consists in








f0(θ, x,u) = (β
−1x+ (1− β−1)θu)f(θ) (8)
under the budget constraint ∫ θ̄
θ
b(θ, x,u)dθ ≤ y (9)
with b(θ, x,u) = B(θ)f(θ) = (C(u)+δK(β−1x−β−1θu))f(θ) where C and K are the
inverse of the strictly concave utility functions u and w. This maximization problem
is convex, since f0 and g are respectively linear and convex in x and u.
Instead of the hidden storage condition (HS) defined at the beginning of section
4.2, we consider a local condition that is a consequence of (HS) when the control










hθ(x(θ),u(θ)) ≥ 0 with hθ(x,u) = β−1δθK
′
(β−1x− β−1θu)− C ′(u). (10)
In order to take into account the budget constraint, we need to add one dimension to
the state variable and consider the function x(θ) = (x1(θ), x2(θ)) with x1(θ) = V (θ)
and x2(θ) = −
∫ θ
θ
B(θ̃)f(θ̃)dθ̃. Since B(θ) = C(V
′
(θ)) + δK(β−1V (θ) − β−1θV ′(θ)),
the control function is
F(θ, x,u) = (u,−g(θ, x1,u))
where g(θ, x1,u) = f(θ)× (C(u) + δK(β−1x1 − β−1θu).
We first consider the corresponding relaxed problem in which we rule out “u
non-decreasing” constraint and further assume that the control u is bounded. What




f0(θ, x1(θ),u(θ))dθ under the control x
′
(θ) = F(θ, x(θ), u(θ)).
This problem has furthermore the initial constraint x2(θ) = 0 and terminal constraint
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x2(θ̄) ≥ −y whereas x1 is free at the end-times θ and θ̄). Besides, we restrict here the
control, so that u ∈ [u, ū], which is equivalent to add the two additional constraints
u ≥ u and u ≤ ū. We denote also by (OC1’) this optimal control problem enriched
with the mixed constraint (10). Those two problems are defined on the space of
absolutely continuous function, that is the Sobolev space W 1,1(Θ) with Θ = (θ, θ̄).
However, when u is bounded, the state variable V has bounded variations, and the
budget constraint translates into an upper bound on V . Besides, we can restrain
our analysis to admissible solutions such that U(V ) ≥ U(V0) where V0 is the full-
bunching admissible solution, and this last condition translates into a lower bound on
V . Thus, both the control and the state variable belongs to a fixed bounded region,
as well as the resources used at period one C(V
′
(θ)) and period two K(β−1V (θ) −
β−1θV
′
(θ)). Therefore, admissible solutions belong to the Sobolev spaceW 1,∞(Θ), i.e.
the variable state v must be Lipschitz continuous with a bounded Lipschitz constant
(and thus almost everywhere differentiable with a derivative u = v
′
that belongs to
the Lebesgue space L∞(Θ)).
In problem (OC1) and (OC1’), the ”non-decreasing” condition on the utility
u(θ) is relaxed and u(θ) is bounded. If we restrict to finding solutions with a
piecewise differentiable and non-decreasing utility u(θ), we can consider a second
optimal control problem, denoted by (OC2), by adding a third dimension to the
state variable and consider the function x(θ) = (x1(θ), x2(θ), x3(θ)) with x2(θ) =
u(θ) and x3(θ) = −
∫ θ
θ
B(θ̃)f(θ̃)dθ̃. The optimal control problem is to maximize∫ θ̄
θ
f0(θ, x1(θ), x2(θ))dθ under the control x
′
(θ) = F̃(θ, x(θ), v(θ)) with a control func-
tion defined by F̃(θ, x, u) = (x2, v,−g(θ, x1, x2)) . The terminal conditions are the
same as before (initial and terminal constraints on x3, and no end-times constraints
on x1 and x2), without the previous constraint u ∈ [u, ū] but with instead the addi-
tional constraint on the control v ≥ 0. We denote also by (OC2’) this optimal control
problem enriched with the mixed constraint (10).
8.1.2 Existence and of necessary conditions for a uniform distribution
The case of a uniform distribution of shocks is treated by first considering bounded
solutions of the relaxed maximization problem, that is the optimal control (OC1)
and (OC1’) defined in the previous section. This is necessary in order to prove the
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existence of an optimum, because usual arguments (such as the coercivity condition
of Tonellli’s existence theorem) do not apply. We then show thereafter that these
bounds can be chosen wide enough so as to be not binding, and that the constraint
“u non-decreasing” is not binding as well.
Under those assumptions, the existence of an optimal solution is relatively straight-
forward. Since the closed unity ball of W 1,∞(Θ) is compact, 25 if we consider a se-
quence of admissible solutions Vn whose expected utilities U(Vn) converges to the
upper bound U∗, we can extract a subsequence that converges uniformly to another
solution V ∗. This solution is admissible, because f0 is linear and g convex, and pro-
vides the maximal expected utility U∗. The necessary conditions are described in the
following lemma:
Lemma 6. The maximization program (M) with a bounded period-1 utility u ∈ [u, ū]
and without the “non-decreasing” condition on u has an optimum which satisfies the
following necessary conditions:
(i) The control u is continuous on [θ, θ̄] and C∞ on the open subset u−1]u, ū[,















[F (θ) + (1− β)θf(θ)] ;
(ii) Transversality conditions: if u(θ) (resp. u(θ̄)) belongs to the open subset ]u, ū[,





= λ−1(1− β−1)θ; (11)













25. More precisely, is it compact for the weak topology, but Mazur’s lemma allows us
to replace our sequence of admissible solutions by a sequence of convex combinations
such that we have uniform convergence of the sequence and point-wise convergence
almost everywhere of its derivative, cf. Brezis corollary 3.8 p 61. Also, the mixed
constraints 10 can be easily rewritten as u ≤ lθ(x1) where lθ is a smooth function,
so weak convergence implies that they hold almost everywhere for the solution V ∗.
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(iv) There is no money burning, i.e. the budget constraint (9) is an equality.
Proof of Lemma 6: Let’s consider an optimal solution (x∗(θ),u∗(θ)) of the pro-
blem (OC1). According to the theorem 15 (p 396) of Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1986),
there exist a number p0 = 0 or 1, and a vector of absolutely continuous functions
p(θ) = (p1(θ), p2(θ))), such that (p0, p1, p2) is never zero, and such that the generali-
zed Lagrangian defined by
L(θ, x,u, p) = p0f0(θ, x1,u) + p1(θ)u− p2(θ)g(θ, x1,u)
satisfies the Euler equations dpi(θ)/dθ = −∂L∗/∂xi for i = 1, 2, and the maximum
principle ∂L∗/∂u = 0 when u∗ ∈]u, ū[ and ∂L∗/∂u ≤ 0 (resp. ≥ 0) if u∗ = u (resp.
u∗ = ū). 26 Here ∗ denotes evaluation at (x∗(θ),u∗(θ)). All those equations hold
almost everywhere. The transversality conditions are p1(θ̄) = p1(θ) = 0, and p2(θ̄) ≥
0 with equality if x2(θ̄) > −y. The second Euler equation implies that p2(θ) is a non
negative constant that we denote p2. We must have p0 = 1. Otherwise, since ∂g/∂x1 >
0, the first Euler equation implies that p1 is non-decreasing and must consequently be
zero to satisfy the transversality condition, so that p2 = 0 as well, which is impossible.
Lastly, if p2 = 0, the first Euler equation implies that dp1(θ)/dθ = −β−1f(θ) which
would contradict the transversality equations. Consequently, p2 > 0 and there is no
money burning, i.e. x2(θ̄) = −y.
We now prove the regularity properties of the optimal solution. Let’s set L̃ = f0−
p2g. The first Euler equation is equivalent to ṗ1(θ) = −∂L̃∗/∂x1 and the maximum
principle can be rewritten as p1(θ) = −∂L̃∗/∂u when u∗ ∈]u, ū[. Thus, on any open









which implies that ∂L̃∗/∂u is continuous, differentiable with respect to θ, and equal
up to a constant to the integrand of ∂L̃∗/∂x1. Besides, the second order Legendre
condition is strictly satisfied, i.e. ∂2L̃/∂2u = −p2f(θ)[C”(u) + δθ2β−2K”(β−1x1 −
β−1θu)] < 0. Thus, using the implicit function theorem and the continuity of the
26. Formally, it would be necessary to add two Lagrange multipliers in order to take
into account the constraint u ∈ [u, ū] but this translates directly into the conditions
set out above, as is formulated in theorem 8 of Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1986).
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state variable, we can invert locally the function ∂L̃/∂u, and prove by recurrence
that u∗(θ) is smooth on I. For the same reason, u cannot make any jump from
u ∈]u, ū[ to ū (resp. to u) since the function ∂L∗/∂u would jump from zero to a
negative (resp. positive) value, which would contradict the maximum principle (and
similarly, there can’t be any jump between u and ū). Therefore, the function u is
continuous.
Lastly, the necessary conditions can be expressed in terms of the consumption c(.)
and w(.) that are respectively defined by the relations u(c(θ)) = u(θ) and βw(k(θ)) =

















= (1− β−1)θf(θ)− p2f(θ)[C
′
(u(θ))− δβ−1θK ′(β−1x1(θ)− β−1θu(θ)]
and the latter relation can be rewritten as








Transversality conditions p1(θ) = 0 at θ, θ̄ imply that integrating the first Euler
equation leads to
∫
L∗x1 = 0 which is equivalent to the left part of the inverse Euler
equation (5). Besides, the transversality conditions presented in Lemma 6(ii) result
directly from the maximum principle, that is p1(θ) = −L̃∗u when u ∈]u, ū[. Lastly, on


















[F (θ) + (1− β)θf(θ)]
with λ = p2. We have θu
′
(c(θ))c′(θ) = −βw′(k(θ))k′(θ) so that B′(θ)/u′(θ) =
1/u
′
(c(θ)) − δθ/βw′(k(θ)), and the Euler-Lagrange equation is also equivalent to
the relation (4). We have also
θf(θ)− f(θ) λ
u′(c(θ))
= θL̃∗x1 + L̃
∗
u.
When the bounds u and ū are not binding, the maximum principle and the tran-
versality conditions imply respectively that this is equal to the derivative d(θL̃∗u)/dθ
and that its integral over the whole interval is zero, which is equivalent to the second





We have therefore proved the necessary conditions of Lemma 6. 
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8.1.3 Proof of proposition 3 when f is uniform
We first show that the necessary conditions described in lemma 6 imply that
neither the “non-decreasing” condition nor the (large enough) bounds on the control
are binding. Properties (i) and (ii) of Proposition 3 follow from the arguments given
in the core text, whereas the property (iii) is proved at the end of this section.
Proof of Proposition 3 (the “non-decreasing” constraint is not binding): The re-
lation (2) holds on intervals where u ∈]u, ū[ and implies thatB′(θ)/u′(θ) = 1/u′(c(θ))−
δθ/βw
′
(k(θ)), so that we can rewrite Euler-Lagrange equation (4), when the distri-



























The left term of this equation is non negative iff u(θ) is non-decreasing or, equiva-
lently, iff the term δ/w
′
(k(θ)) is non-increasing. According to the left part of the in-
verse Euler equation (5), the right term of this equation is non negative iff δ/w
′
(k(θ))
has a value greater or equal to its means time 1− β
2
. This implies that the continuous
function δ/w
′
(k(θ)) can never take a value under its means time 1− β
2
(since it would
stay there and increase up to this value), and is always non-increasing. Thus, the
control u(θ) is an increasing function. 
Proof of Proposition 3 (the optimal solution is bounded): We prove that the op-
timal solution is bounded, as well as the Lagrange multiplier λ, and that those bounds
do not depend on the parameter β. According to the previous paragraph, when the
distribution of shocks is uniform, c is non-decreasing and k is non-increasing. The-
refore, if we denote by θ0 (resp. θ1) the infinum (resp. the supremum) of θ such that
u(θ) ∈]u, ū[, we have u ∈]u, ū[ on the interval I =]θ0, θ1[. On this interval, according













We set c = c(θ), c̄ = c(θ̄), k = k(θ̄) and k̄ = k(θ). The integral over I of the left part
























We know from the previous paragraph that δ/w
′
(k̄) ≥ λ−1 ≥ δ/w′(k) ≥ λ−1(1−β/2),











The budget constraint provides an upper bound on c and k, thus an upper bound on
1/u′(c) and 1/w′(k). The previous inequalities provides therefore upper bounds on c
and λ−1 which are independent of ū and β, so that we can get θ1 = θ̄ by choosing a
sufficiently high ū.
Let’s now consider the lower bound. According to Lemma 6(ii), the second trans-
versality condition is an equality, so that we can rewrite the integral of the Euler-









× (2θ0 − θ) + λ−1βθ0 (14)
which implies 1/u
′
(c) ≥ λ−1θ0. If c were arbitrarily small, so would be λ−1 , and also
both c̄ and k̄ according respectively to relation (13) and (14). This can not be since
we must at least get the expected utility obtained with the bunching solution. We
get therefore a lower bound on c that does not depend on β. We can therefore choose
a lower bound that is not binding, and infer then a lower bound on λ−1 from the
Inverse Euler Equation established in Lemma 6(iii). 
Proof of Proposition 3(iii) (β small): It is shown in the previous paragraph that,
when β varies, consumptions c(.) and k(.), as well as the budget multiplier λ and
the derivative u′(c(.)), remain in compact subsets of R+∗. Let’s consider a sequence
of βn → 0 such that the corresponding parameter λn of the optimal solution (cn, kn)
converges to a real number λ. The transversality conditions imply that the decreasing
function kn(θ) tends uniformly to a constant k > 0 such that w
′
(k) = δλ. The
relation (2), that is θu
′
(θ) = −βw′(θ), implies that the sequence of function cn(.)
tends to a constant c as well. Those solutions satisfy the inverse Euler equation 5





words, the optimal solution converges, when β tends to zero, to the optimal bunching
solution. Besides, using relation (2) again, we can write budget variations as







and it is easy to see that it becomes always negative when β is small enough.
It remains to show the concavity of the the implementation curve K(c), which is
defined on the domain spanned by c by the relation K(.) = k(c−1(.)). Its derivative
is




From the proof of Proposition 3(iii), we know that this derivative is asymptotically
equivalent to −θ/βδ when β tends to zero. The second derivative is










It is straightforward from relation (12) that c′(θ)/β tends uniformly to zero when β
tends to zero, and this property holds also for k′(θ) according to relation (2). This
implies that c′K′′ is asymptotically equivalent to −1/βδ when β tends to zero, which
implies K′′ < 0. 
8.1.4 General proof of proposition 3
In the following, we relax the assumption of a uniform distribution of shocks,
consider any type of distribution with a positive density f(θ) on the interval [θ, θ̄],
and assume the existence of piecewise-C1-optimal solutions.
Proof of Proposition 3: We consider the optimal control problem (OC2) and as-
sume, as formulated in proposition 3, the existence of an optimal allocation which is




3(θ)) and follow a similar
reasonement to that of the previous section, using again the theorem 15 of Seierstad
and Sydsaeter (1986): accordingly, there exist a number p0 = 0 or 1, and a vector of
absolutely continuous functions p(θ) = (p1(θ), p2(θ)), p3(θ)), such that (p0, p1, p2, p3)
is never zero and the generalized Lagrangian defined by
L(θ, x, v, p) = p0f0(θ, x1, x2) + p1(θ)x2 + p2(θ)v − p3(θ)g(θ, x1, x2)
satisfies the Euler equations dpi(θ)/dθ = −∂L∗/∂xi for i = 1, 2, 3 where ∗ denotes
evaluation at (x∗(θ), v∗(θ)). The maximum principle is p2(θ) = ∂L
∗/∂v = 0 when
v∗ > 0 and p2(θ) = ∂L
∗/∂v ≤ 0 if v∗ = 0. All those equations hold almost everywhere.
The transversality conditions are p1(θ̄) = p1(θ) = p2(θ̄) = p2(θ) = 0, and p3(θ̄) ≥ 0
with equality if x3(θ̄) > −y. The same arguments as before imply that p0 = 1, that
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p3(θ) is a positive constant that we denote p3 (i.e. there is no money burning) and,
if we set L̃ = f0 − p3g, we have again, on any open subset I of Θ such that v∗ > 0,









that implies the regularity properties of the optimal solution (that is, the function
u(θ) is smooth on any such open subset). As before, those necessary conditions can
be expressed in terms of consumptions functions c(.) and k(.), defined by the relations
u(c(θ)) = u(θ) and w(k(θ)) = x1(θ)−θx2(θ)(we omit again thereafter the superscript
*). The constraint v ≥ 0 implies that those functions are respectively non-decreasing
and non-increasing. The first Euler equation can be rewritten as




The transversality conditions p1(θ) = 0 at θ, θ̄ implies
∫




dθ. As in the previous section, we set λ = p3. Besides, since w
′
(k(θ)) is
non decreasing, the function p1(θ) is non-decreasing then non-increasing, and conse-
quently is non negative.




(θ). On interval where the
solution is non constant (v > 0), the Maximum Principle and the second Euler
equation imply p1(θ) = −∂L̃∗/∂x2, so that B′(θ) is non-negative. We have thus
proved property (i) of proposition 3.
Regarding the case β < 1, the proof is similar to the one given in the previous
section using the following lemma, proven at the end of this section:
Lemma 7. When β tends to zero, solutions of the optimal control problem (OC2)





and c+ δk = y.
In order to follow the proof given previously, we just need to check that c′(θ)/β





































which yields the desired property since δθ
w′(k(θ))




Proof of Lemma 7: Let θ1 be the infinum of θ ∈ [θ, θ̄] such that v∗(θ) > 0. Then,
from the first Euler equation and the transversality condition







whereas the Maximum Principle and the second Euler equation implies








0 ≤ ( δ
w′(k(θ))







The budget condition implies that c(θ) ≤ y so that 1/u′(c(θ)) ≤ 1/u′(y). Thus, when
β tends to zero, both δ/w
′
(k(θ))− λ−1 and β/λ tends to zero. Let’s now consider θ2
be the supremum of θ ∈ [θ, θ̄] such that v∗(θ) > 0. From the first Euler equation and
the transversality condition, we obtain similarly







whereas the Maximum Principle and the second Euler equation implies







and, combining those two relations, we obtain (since k(θ̄) = k(θ2))
(λ−1 − δ
w′(k(θ̄))
)(1− F (θ2)− θ2f(θ2)) = βf(θ2)(
1
u′(c(θ2))
− θ2λ−1) ≥ −βf(θ2)θ2λ−1




0 ≤ (λ−1 − δ
w′(k(θ̄))




and those terms tends to zero when β tends to zero. It is then easy to see that
the previous inequality implies as well that (λ−1 − δ
w′ (k(θ̄))
)θ2f(θ2) tends to zero
when β tends to zero. Since f has a strictly positive lower bound by assumption,
this implies that δ/w′(k(θ)) − λ−1 tends uniformly to zero when β tends to zero,
and this is also the case with regard to the variation of the function δ/w′(k(θ)).
Since E[k(θ)] is bounded by the budget constraint, this implies as well that the
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variation of the function k(θ) tends to zero when β tends to zero. Besides, it is quite
straightforward that the period-2 consumption in the optimal solution cannot tends
to zero. Indeed, if lim0+ w(k) = −∞, the expected utility tends to −∞ as well.
Otherwise, if lim0+ w(k) = w(0) ∈ R, then period-1 consumption will tend to the
constant u(y), and this solution will provide less expected utility than the optimal
bunching solution defined in the lemma. Thus, when β tends to zero, the optimal
solution {c(θ), k(θ)} tends uniformly to the bunching solution. 
8.1.5 Proof of proposition 4
Once again, we consider in the following any type of distribution with a positive
density f(θ) on the interval [θ, θ̄], and assume the existence of piecewise-C1-optimal
solutions for the optimal control problem considered.
Proof of Proposition 4 (β small): The proof follows easily from the limit pro-
perty of the optimal solution when β tends to zero expressed in lemma 7. Indeed, if we
note U(θ, θ
′
, ε) = θu(c(θ
′
)−ε)+βw(k(θ′)+δ−1ε), the hidden storage condition is then
equivalent to U(θ, θ
′
, ε) ≤ U(θ, θ, 0) for all θ′ , θ ∈ Θ and ε ∈ [0, c(θ′)]. Any admissible
solution satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint U(θ, θ
′
, 0) ≤ U(θ, θ, 0). There-
fore, a sufficient condition for the hidden storage constraint to hold is that U(θ, θ
′
, ε)
is non-increasing with respect to ε. Its derivative is −θu′(c(θ′)−ε)+βδ−1w′(k(θ′)+ε)
which is negative when β is small enough according to lemma 7. 
Proof of Proposition 4 (β = 1): Let’s consider the maximization problem (OC2’)





(x2). We apply again the theorem of Seierstad and Syd-
saeter (1986) mentioned above. The only difference here is that we need to consider
one more Lagrange multiplier, i.e. a bounded, measurable and non negative func-




2(θ)) is always zero, and modify accordingly the
generalized Lagrangian L which becomes
L(θ, x, v, p) = p0f0(θ, x1, x2)+p1(θ)x2+p2(θ)v−p3(θ)g(θ, x1, x2)+q(θ)hθ(x1(θ), x2(θ))
At the optimal allocation, it satisfies the Euler equations dpi(θ)/dθ = −∂L∗/∂xi
for i = 1, 2, 3 where ∗ denotes evaluation at (x∗(θ), v∗(θ)). The maximum principle
is p2(θ) = ∂L
∗/∂v = 0 when v∗ > 0 and p2(θ) = ∂L
∗/∂v ≤ 0 if v∗ = 0. As
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before, all those equations hold almost everywhere. Transversality conditions are
p1(θ̄) = p1(θ) = p2(θ̄) = p2(θ) = 0, and p3(θ̄) ≥ 0 with equality if x3(θ̄) > −y. When
β = 1, we have f0(θ, x1, x2) = β
−1x1f(θ) so the first Euler equation is











which implies, since ∂hθ/∂x1 > 0, that p3 > 0. Using
∂g
∂x2
(θ, x1(θ), x2(θ)) = −hθ(x1(θ), x2(θ))f(θ),
the second Euler equation can be rewritten as






We want to show that h(θ) ≡ hθ(x∗1(θ), x∗2(θ)) is always zero. We use the fact that
when p2(θ̃) < 0 for some θ̃ ∈ [θ, θ̄[, then h(θ) > 0 for θ close to and higher than θ̃.
Indeed, it implies v∗ = 0 locally around a neighborhood of θ̃, x∗2(θ) is constant and
h′(θ) = β−1δK
′
(β−1x1 − β−1θx2) > 0.
We first show that h(θ̄)= 0. When p1(θ) = 0, since ∂hθ/∂x2 < 0, the second Euler
equation implies that p′2(θ) < 0 is equivalent to hθ(x1(θ), x2(θ)) > 0. At θ = θ̄, we
have p1(θ̄) = p2(θ̄) = 0, and if p
′
2(θ̄) was negative, then p2 would be positive for θ
close to and lower than θ̄, which would contradict the maximum principle. Therefore
p′2(θ̄) ≥ 0, so that h(θ̄) is indeed zero.
Let’s now assume that h(θ̃) > 0 for some θ̃ ∈ [θ, θ̄[. Since h is increasing when
v∗ = 0 and since h must decrease in order to take value zero at θ = θ̄, we can choose
θ̃ so that we have both h > 0 and v∗ > 0 on a local neighborhood around θ̃. In
that case, p2 = q = 0 and the second Euler equation requires p1 negative. Since
p1(θ) = 0, it implies that θ̃ > θ and that there exist θ0 ∈]θ, θ̃[ such that p1(θ0) = 0
and p′1(θ0) ≤ 0. This leads to a contradiction. Indeed, the last term −q.∂hθ/∂x1
in the first Euler equation is non-positive whereas the first two terms are equal
to r(θ)f(θ)β−1 where r(θ) = −p0 + p3δK ′(β−1x∗1(θ) − β−1θx∗2(θ)) whose derivative
r′(θ) = −p3β−1θv∗(θ)δK ′′(β−1x∗1(θ)−β−1θx∗2(θ)) is negative. The multiplier p1 must
be able to increase again in order to reach zero at p1(θ̄). This implies r(θ0) > 0, so that
q(θ0) > 0 and h(θ0) = 0. But the second Euler equation then implies p
′
2(θ0) > 0 since
∂hθ/∂x2 < 0. This requires p2(θ0) < 0 and v = 0 in order to respect the Maximum
principle. As shown previously, h must be strictly positive in a local neighborhood
of θ0 and, in particular, h(θ0) > 0, which is contradictory. Therefore we have proved
by contradiction that h = 0, and consequently B(θ) is constant. 
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8.2 Supplementary material for sections 5.2 and 5.3
Proof of Lemma 1 (two-type model): We first consider the problem without the hid-
den storage constraint, and look at the more general problem at the end. The maxi-
mization problem satisfies some basic properties proved thereafter:
— Existence of optima: the budget constraint provides upper bounds for consump-
tions and, if limu(0+) = −∞, one can find a lower bound ε > 0 for consumptions
once we restrict to allocations providing a minimum budget. Thus, admissible
solutions belong to a compact space, and consequently, optima exists within this
space.
— The two inequalities kl ≥ kh and ch ≥ cl are strict. If it were not the case,
both would be equalities in order to comply to the incentive constraints. In this
case, if we increase slightly ch, and decrease slightly cl while maintaining the
budget constant, then the objective function will increase in proportion since
θh > θl. On the contrary, if we increase slightly kl, and decrease slightly kh while
maintaining the budget constant, then the variation of the objective function
will be dominated by a constant factor times the square of the decrease of kl
(and negative since the utility function w is strictly concave). If we rewrite the
incentive constraints as θh(u(ch)− u(cl)) ≥ δβ(v(kl)− v(kh)) ≥ θl(u(ch)− u(cl)),
it is easy to see that we can combine those two approaches in order to improve
the expected utility while maintaining the incentive constraints valid.
— No money burning: the budget is entirely used at the optimum, i.e. (BC) is an
equality. Otherwise, it is possible to increase ch and cl while keeping u(ch)−u(cl)
constant, thus improving the expected utility and still satisfying the incentive
compatibility constraints.
— Unicity of the optimum: this is easily seen by considering the utility of consump-
tions instead: the objective and the incentive compatibility constraints are then
linear whereas the budget constraint is a ceiling on a strictly convex function
of those variables. The fact that there is no money burning at an optimal solu-
tion implies the unicity since otherwise one would be able to combine optimal
solutions to find another one with money burning.
— At the optimum, the constraint (ICl) is an equality and (ICh) is a strict in-
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equality. Indeed, if the incentive constraint (ICl) were a strict inequality, then
it would be possible to increase kh and decrease kl while maintaining constant





(kl), this improve the objective function. The constraint (ICl) is thus an equa-
lity and, since θh > θl, the second constraint (ICh) is slack.
— The solution of the problem coincides with the solution of the relaxed problem
where the constraint (ICh) is removed. Indeed, the previous arguments can be
used to show that such allocation also satisfy kl ≥ kh and ch ≥ cl, and that the
constraint (ICl) is binding, which implies that (ICh) is also satisfied.
We can then reduce the maximization problem to the following problem:
maxπ(θhu(ch) + δv(kh)) + (1− π)(θlu(cl) + δv(kl))
subject to budget and incentive compatibility constraint:θlu(ch) + βδv(kh) ≤ θlu(cl) + βδv(kl) (ICl)π(ch + δkh) + (1− π)(cl + δkl) ≤ y (BC)
If we introduce lagrangian multipliers λ1 and λ2 for the two constraints, the first















(cl)− (1− π)λ2 = 0
(1− π)δv′(kl) + λ1βδv
′
(kl)− (1− π)δλ2 = 0

























Let’s show that the function B(θ) is non-decreasing when β = 1. The two previous


















− (1− β)λ−12 (17)
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so cl + βδkl ≤ ch + βδkh. Thus, when β = 1, we have ch + δkh ≥ cl + δkl i.e. the
function B(θ) is non-decreasing.
Let’s now show that, when β < θl/θh, the function B(θ) is decreasing. Relations

















+ λ−12 (βθh − θl) (19)





























and thus ch − cl < δ(kl − kh), i.e. B(θ) is decreasing.
We now consider the problem with the additional constraint of a non-increasing
budget, i.e. ch+δkh ≤ cl+δkl (a weaker constraint than the hidden storage condition).
The previous results imply that this constraint is binding when β = 1 i.e. there is no





(kx) for x = l, h, satisfies the incentive constraint and the
no storage condition. Let’s call this allocation A1. It satisfies the Euler equation, i.e.
the derivative of the utility delivered by this allocation, with respect to the budget,








(ch) + (1− π)u
′
(cl).
Lastly, it remains to check that the solutions considered here satisfy the hidden









both in the general case and regarding the allocation A1. Thus an individual getting
the low-type allocation has no incentive to store money. On the other hand, what
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happen if a low type individual falsely reports and gets the high type allocation ?
He could then store money in order to maximize his expected utility θlu(ch − δε) +
δβv(kh + ε). This is not optimal when β = 1 since A1 is the first best allocation with
no budget transfer between types. This not optimal either when β < θl/θh, since




(kh) in that case. Thus, the hidden storage
condition is not binding in this latter case, and is equivalent to a non-decreasing
budget condition in the case β = 1. 27 
Proof of Lemma 3 (infinite-horizon problem): Proof of L(V∞) ≥ V∞ ≥ a∗uγ:
— In order to show L(V∞(y)) ≥ V∞(y), let’s consider an optimal allocation c(.)
for the infinite-horizon problem that delivers the expected utility V∞(y).
28 We





for x = l, h. Since the allocation c(θx, θ̂
t) is also an admissible allocation for




i))] lower than V∞(kx), so there is a value k
′
x ≤ kx such that
U0(θx) = V̄∞(k
′
x). We set c
′
l = cl and c
′
h = ch. The allocation {c′x, k′x} is an
admissible allocation for the problem L(V∞)(y
′) with y′ = E[c′x + δk
′
x] ≤ y. In-
deed, according to lemma 1(iii), we just need to check the incentive compatibility
constraint for low type and the decreasing budget condition, which is straightfor-
ward. Thus, we obtain a two-period allocation which is admissible for the problem
L(V∞)(y
′) with y′ ≤ y, and delivers an expected utility greater than V∞(y). This
implies the desired inequality.
— The inequality V∞ ≥ a∗u results from the fact that the infinite allocation A∞
is an admissible allocation for the problem V∞(1). Indeed, it is easy to see that
27. If we set β̃ = θl(u(ch) − u(cl))/(w(kl) − w(kh)) with the consumption values
defined by the allocation A1, it is easy to see that A1 is still the optimal allocation
(under hidden storage constraint) when β ∈ [β̃, 1], so that the budget function is
constant in these cases (no transfer between types). When β ∈]θl/θh, β̃[, allocation
A1 is not admissible, and relation (19) shows that the hidden storage constraint is
binding at the optimal allocation.
28. The same argument used at the beginning of the proof of Lemma 1 (coupled
with the Tychonov’s theorem) implies that admissible solutions of the infinite-horizon
problems belong to a compact space, so that optimal solutions exist, and that there
is ”no money burning” as well.
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this allocation delivers a∗uγ(1) as expected utility and that the total budget
used by this allocation is equal to one. 29 It remains to check that the incentive
compatibility constraints (ICHS2) are satisfied. At period t after the history









and the expected utility delivered is equal
to a∗uγ(kx(θ̂
t−1)). When ε = 0, the incentive compatibility constraints are then
a direct consequence of the incentive compatibility constraints of the two-period
allocation A∗. When ε > 0, as mentioned in footnote 9, the allocation of resources
with hidden savings must still be incentive compatible. Thus, when one transfers ε
savings to subsequent periods after history {θ̂t−1, θx}, the expected utility cannot
be greater than a∗uγ(kx(θ̂
t−1) + δε). The incentive compatibility constraints with
hidden storage follows. 
Proof of lemma 4 (Usury laws and penalization): We recall that we are under the
assumption β < θl/θh. As previously, we rule out the case γ = 1 which satisfies the
same properties and is treated explicitly in the proof of proposition 7. When the
usury constraint is binding, the problem defined by L̄ is not convex anymore and
there can be multiple optimal solutions. The following lemma extends lemma 1 to
the operator L̄. The property (iv) is a technical condition that is used to ensure the
validity of the numerical simulations presented in the core text.
Lemma 8. Any optimum of the problem defined by the operator L̄ satisfies the
following property (assuming β < θl/θh):
















(ii) There is no penalization (zk = 0) at optimal allocations when the usury rate Ru
is close enough to the implicit interest rate R̄ (defined at the optimal allocation
obtained when there is no usury law) ;
29. Convergence results from the fact, shown at the beginning of the proof of lemma
1, that there is no money burning (i.e. E[c∗x + δk
∗
x] = 1) and that the budget is not




h) < 1). The expected utility a
∗
∞
delivered by A∞ for a budget y = 1 then satisfies the relation a∗∞ = E[θxuγ(cx)] +
δE[k1−γx a
∗




(iii) The optimum considered in (ii) is then unique and is also the solution of the
similar problem in which the incentive compatibility constraint for high type
and the hidden storage condition for low type are relaxed ;
(iv) A sufficient condition to have no penalization as in (ii) is
Ru > R̃ ≡ (1 + θl/β − θh − δ)/δ (21)
This lemma is proven thereafter. It is then easy to show that, when the condition
(ii) of the previous lemma is satisfied, the properties stated in lemmas 2 and 3 still
hold, i.e. the function f̄ defined by f̄(a) = L̄(au(z))(1)/u(1) has a unique fixed point
a†, and the corresponding two-period allocation A† induces an infinite allocation
which corresponds to the optimal solution, noted V̄∞, of the infinite-horizon problem
constrained by the usury law. Indeed, the convexity property of function f are shown
in the proof of lemma 2 by using slight modifications of an allocation that leave
unchanged the usury constraint (UL). Similarly, the limit property of f are obtained
by considering two allocations that satisfy this constraint (since we have kl = kh
for both of them). Lastly, regarding lemma 3, the proof must be slightly modified in
order to prove the inequality L̄(V̄∞) ≥ V̄∞. More precisely, we need to follow the same
approach, starting for an optimal allocation providing expected utility V̄∞(y), and
to build a two-period admissible allocation for the problem L̄(V∞(y
′)) for a budget
y′ ≤ y. Using the same notation, we can replace kl by the lower value k′l since it
still satisfy the usury constraint. We may have k′h < kh but cannot replace kh by
k′h without violating the usury constraint. Instead, we can consider the allocation
with second-period consumption for high type equal to kh and a penalty equal to
zh = V̄∞(kh) − V̄∞(k′h). Since we restrict here to the case β < θl/θh, we just need
to check the incentive compatibility constraint for low type without hidden storage,
according to lemma 8(iii). Thus, if we keep c′l = cl and c
′
h = ch, we obtain a two-
period allocation that is admissible for the problem L̄(V∞(y
′)) with y′ = E[c′x + δk
′
x].
The desired inequality L̄(V̄∞) ≥ V̄∞ follows. Similar arguments then allow us to
conclude by showing that V̄∞ corresponds to the fixed point of L̄.
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Proof of lemma 8 (two-type model with usury constraint and penalization): We follow
the same approach and notation as when proving lemma 1. Let’s first consider the
basic property of optimal solutions of this maximization problem when the hidden
storage constraints are relaxed. Existence follows from the same argument of compa-
city. The incentive compatibility constraints with no hidden storage can be rewritten
as θl(u(ch)−u(cl)) ≤ βδ(v(kl)−v(kh)+zh) ≤ θh(u(ch)−u(cl)) which implies ch ≥ cl.
This latter inequality is strict, otherwise we can improve the allocation by slightly
increasing ch and decreasing cl while maintaining the budget constant (the usury and
the incentive compatibility constraints are then satisfied once zk is slightly increased
as well). We have also kl > kh. Otherwise, it would imply zk > 0 and we could
similarly slightly increase kl and decrease kh while maintaining the budget constant
and still satisfying the usury constraint. Then, a slight decrease of zk is necessary
to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints, and the expected utility is strictly
improved which yields a contradiction. Also, there is no money burning otherwise,
since utility is CRRA, one could improve the allocation by multiplying all consump-
tions by a scaling factor. The same arguments used in the proof of lemma 1 show
that the constraint (IC ′l) is an equality, that (IC
′
h) is a strict inequality, and that
the optimal allocations of this problem coincide with the optimal allocations of the
similar problem in which (IC ′h) is relaxed.
We can then reduce the problem to the maximization (M3) under the budget
constraint (BC), the incentive compatibility constraint (IC ′l), the usury constraint
(UL) and a positive penalization zk ≥ 0. We need to add two non-negative multipliers
λ3 and λ4 for the two latter constraints. The usury constraint can be rewritten as















(cl)− (1− π)λ2 − λ3 =
(1− π)δv′(kl) + λ1βδv
′
(kl)− (1− π)δλ2 − δ′λ3 = 0
−πδ + βδλ1 + λ4 = 0
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(1− π)λ2 + λ3
θlu
′(cl)
−(1−π) = (1− π)λ2 + δ
′δ−1λ3
βv′(kl)
−(1−π)/β = π/β−λ4/βδ (23)
The inverse Euler inequality (property (i) of lemma 8) results directly from relation












which is strict when the usury constraint is binding, i.e. when λ3 > 0 (as before,
we have λ2 = L̄
′(v)(1) since the Lagrangian λ2 is the budget multiplier). Also, one
can combine relations (22) and (23) in order to obtain a variant of the first order















We now prove property (iv) of lemma 8 by looking at what happen when there
is penalization at the optimal allocation. When zk > 0, we must have λ4 = 0 and








so that, when zk > 0, we have λ2π = δ
′δ−1λ3 which implies, using relation (22), that
λ2 = v
′(kl). It provides the two following relations
θlu
′(cl) =
1− π + πδδ′−1






These relations implies, since ch > cl, that
(1 + π(δδ′−1 − 1))(1/β − θh/θl) > (δδ′−1 − 1)(π/β + 1− π)
which can be rewritten as 1 + θl/β − θh > δδ′−1 = δ(1 + Ru). Reversely, this means
that when Ru > R̃ = (1 + θl/β − θh − δ)/δ, we cannot have zk > 0. 30
Let’s then prove property (ii) of lemma 8, i.e. there is no penalization when
Ru is close enough to R̄. We use a reductio ad absurdum argument: let’s assume
30. This implies also, in accordance with our previous results, that there is never
penalization when the usury rate is not binding (since we have then λ3 = 0).
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instead that there is a sequence of optimal allocations with strict penalization, for
a sequence of usury rate Rn converging to R̄. We can easily see that the sequence
of corresponding parameters belong to a compact space. Indeed, consumptions are
bounded by the budget constraint. Besides, they are strictly greater than a positive
number independent of the usury rate. Otherwise, using the explicit formulas given
in the previous paragraph when zk > 0, all consumptions allocated by such optimal
solutions would be together arbitrarily close to zero, and the budget constraint would
not be binding anymore. The relations obtained in this case also imply that the
Lagrangians λ2 and λ3 belong to a compact subset of R+∗. Consequently, we can
extract a subsequence such that the consumptions and all the parameters of the first
order conditions converge. This defines an allocation that is admissible and which
satisfies the first order allocation with λ3 > 0. This allocation is thus optimal for the
problem at Ru = R̄. However, when Ru = R̄, problems with or without the usury
constraint coincide, the optimal allocation is unique and with no penalization, i.e.
λ3 = 0 which yields a contradiction
A consequence of this result is that, when Ru is close enough to R̄, the general
properties of the optimal allocation when there is no usury constraint are still valid.




(kh) (also shown in the proof of
Lemma 1 when β < θl/θh) are still valid. Using the same arguments as in lemma 1, it
implies that the budget function is decreasing and that the hidden storage constraint
is not binding. Lemma 8(iii) follows. 
Proof of lemma 5 (properties of the curves CM and CF when γ = 1): Part (i) of




I(x) = −πfI(x)/(1−π)x and f ′M(x) =
−π/(1 − π). Besides, as shown in lemma 8, the inverse Euler equation is a strict
inequality when there is a usury constraint. This property means here that πk†h +
(1− π)k†l < 1, which implies that P ′ lies strictly under the curve CM .
In order to address part (ii) of the lemma, we obtain the slope of the curve CF at
P by differentiating the system of equations that defines it (with a slight abuse of
notation, we remove thereafter the * to lighten notation in the following paragraph)
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
πdch + (1− π)dcl = −πδdkh − (1− π)δdkl (a)
θldch/ch − θldcl/cl = βδ(1− δ)−1(dkl/kl − dkh/kh) (b)
β(1− δ)−1dch = θldkh (c)
We eliminate dcl by combining the two first relations and, using the last relation,
obtain the slope of the curve CF at P :
dkl
dkh
= −(1− π)βδ(1− δ)
−1/kh + θlπδ/cl + ((1− π)θl/ch + πθl/cl)θl(1− δ)/β
(θl/cl − β(1− δ)−1/kl) (1− π)δ
which is negative according to relation (18): the curve CF is decreasing locally around
P . It remains to prove that it is more decreasing at P than CI , which is equivalent
to dkl/dkh < −πkl/(1 − π)kh. Using the previous relation and the fact that, at the
optimal solution, the inverse Euler equation implies E[cx] = 1− δ and E[kx] = 1 (no
aggregate transfer across periods), this condition can be rewritten as







This inequality is always satisfied, according to the first order condition (17) which
can be rewritten, in the case of logarithmic utility, as kl = 1− β + βclθl(1−δ) .
Lastly, we need to show that P ′ = (k†h, k
†
l ) is under the curve CF . This results from
the fact that this point is on a curve C ′F defined by a similar system of equations with
budget constraint (BC) and incentive compatibility constraint (IC), and a slightly
different first order condition. We use relation (24) instead, obtained in the proof of
Lemma 8 , which gives
θlk
†
h − β(1− δ)












where λ3 is the Lagrangian multiplier associated to the usury law, and v = V̄∞. The
fact that the left term is negative results from relation (20), which holds when Ru is










= (1 + R̄)
δβ
θl
where δ̄ = 1/(1 + R̄) = (c∗h − c∗l )/(k∗l − k∗h).
Let’s then prove that C ′F is indeed locally “under” the curve CF . For any point
{kh, kl} on CF close to P , for ε > 0 small, we can divide kl and kh by 1 + ε, and
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find an ε′ > 0 such that, when multiplying cl and ch by 1 + ε
′, both the budget and
the incentive constraint are still respected. Thus, we end up with another point such
that the left part of relation (27) is negative. It is easy to see that one can choose ε
so that this negative value is exactly the value at the right of relation (27). The new
point then belongs to C ′F . Consequently, we can move from CF to C ′F by decreasing
both kl and kh. Since the curve C ′F is locally decreasing around P ′, it implies that,
locally around the point P and P ′, the curve C ′F is under the curve CF . The property
follows. 
Proof of proposition 7(ii) (impact of usury law when γ < 1): The method is simi-
lar to the proof of part (i) of this proposition, except that we consider more generally
curves CF (a, α) defined implicitly by three equations - the first one being derived from





+ θhβ − θl = α (EQ1)
πch + (1− π)cl = 1− πδkh − (1− π)δkl (BC)
θl(uγ(ch)− uγ(cl)) = βδa(uγ(kl)− uγ(kh)) (IC)
Once again, it is easy to see that this system of equations has at most two real
solutions kl for a given kh, and at most one solution kh for a given kl.
31 We need first
to compare the position of the curves CF (a∗, 0) and CF (a†, α) where a∗ (resp. a†) is
the fixed point of the function associated to the operator L (resp. the operator L̄),
and α < 0 corresponds to the value given by the relation (24).
One must to notice that, adding a usury constraint decreases the expected value,
i.e. L̄ ≤ L, and that, when γ < 1, it implies a† < a∗. An important difference between
the case γ < 1 and the case γ > 1 is that, in the latter case, we have a† > a∗ so that,
as shown in the next paragraph, the position of the curve CF (a∗, 0) with respect to
CF (a†, α) is ambiguous.
Under the asssumption γ < 1, we need then to show that, for a value a slightly
31. Indeed, if kl is fixed, then ch (resp. cl) is an increasing (a decreasing) function
of kh, and the (IC) can be rewritten with the left part (resp. the right part) being
an increasing (resp. a decreasing) function of kh. If kh is fixed, then ch is given, and
the relation (IC) can be rewritten with the left part (resp. the right part) being a
convex (resp. a concave) function of kl.
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lower than a∗, and α small and negative, the curve CF (a, α) is under the curve
CF (a∗, 0) in a neighborhood of P . Let’s choose kh close to k∗h, and consider the points
(kh, kl) and (k̃h, k̃l), with k̃h = kh, respectively on the curve CF (a∗, 0) and CF (a, α).
Those curves are defined by a system of equations that implicitly associates to those
two points a unique set of allocations, respectively (ch, cl, kh, kl) and (c̃h, c̃l, k̃h, k̃l).
Let’s note dcx = c̃x − cx and dkx = k̃x − kx the small variations from the first to the
second point (for x = k, l). We need to show k̃l < kl that is, dkl < 0.
— If α becomes slightly negative, then ch increases according to the relation (EQ1),










γ(cl) so that dcl > 0 and dkl < 0.
— If a is slightly lowered, then ch increases according to the relation (EQ1), i.e.







γ(ch)dch − βδ(uγ(kl)− uγ(kh))da > 0
which implies as well dkl < 0.
It remains to show that the curve CF (a∗, 0) is steeper than the curve CI at P . In
order to do that, we differentiate the system of equation defining this curve, using
the fact that, since uγ is CRRA, the derivative of 1/u
′
γ is proportionate to 1/uγ:
βa∗uγ(kh)dch = θluγ(ch)dkh
πdch + (1− π)dcl = −πδdkh − (1− π)δdkl
θlu
′
γ(ch)dch − θlu′γ(cl)dcl = βδa∗(u′γ(kl)dkl − u′γ(kh)dkh)










πθlu′γ(cl) + (1− π)βv′(kh) + θl((1− π)u′γ(ch) + πu′γ(cl))θluγ(ch)/βδv(kh)
where v = a∗uγ. This slope is negative according to relation (18). It remains to prove












and, according to relation (18), the left term is lower than 1−β. When θl and θh tends
to 1, the optimal solution tends to the solution with no shocks, in which kl = kh.
The inequality is then satisfied as soon as kh/kl > 1− β. 
69
